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HOW THE POOR GOT CUT OUT OF BANKING 
Mehrsa Baradaran* 
ABSTRACT 
The United States currently has two banking systems—one for the rich, one 
for the poor.1 It was not always this way. In the past, the U.S. government has 
enlisted certain banking institutions to serve the needs of the poor and offer 
low-cost credit to enable low-income Americans to escape poverty. Credit 
unions, savings and loans, and Morris Banks are three prominent examples of 
government-supported institutions with a specific focus of helping the low-
income. Unfortunately, these institutions are no longer fulfilling their missions, 
and high-cost, usurious, and sometimes predatory check cashers and payday 
lenders have quickly filled the void. These fringe banks do not provide the poor 
with useful credit and further bury them in debt. 
This Article tracks the neglected history of government-sponsored 
institutions designed to offer credit to the indigent and explains how each 
abandoned its initial purpose. In doing so, the Article highlights the shifts in 
modern banking that rapidly increased competition among banks and caused 
homogenization in form. Alternative banking institutions could not survive 
deregulation and were forced to assimilate and operate like mainstream banks, 
with heightened profits as their sole objective. The poor were the victims. 
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Brad Lowe, Tim Nally, Danny Brimhall, Jonathan Love, and Seth Atkisson for their invaluable research 
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1
 The label poor is judgment-laden, paternalistic, and an inadequate description of the relevant group of 
people who are affected by the changes involved in banking. This group includes no-income, low-income, and 
middle-income individuals who are financially vulnerable in many ways. Poverty is not just about low wages 
and may not be a permanent condition, and those who are poor do not share common traits. This Article 
attempts to describe circumstances that affect those that have fewer financial resources and less access relative 
to others in society. These individuals are often low-income individuals—sometimes minorities or immigrants 
and sometimes less educated than their more wealthy counterparts—but no single one of these traits is the 
defining trait of the poor. Although the terms poor, underprivileged, and low-income do not accurately capture 
this group and have unintended negative connotations, I will use these labels interchangeably throughout the 
Article. 
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This Article proposes the reestablishment of government-sponsored banks 
to serve the poor. Options include redesigning existing government measures 
and a novel proposal to use the existing Postal Service branches to offer low-
cost, short-term credit to the low-income. Such proposals have strong historic 
roots and could offer credit services to millions of Americans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Poverty in the United States is rising while economic mobility is declining. 
A complex variety of factors and circumstances cause poverty, making its 
alleviation a difficult puzzle for even the most committed policy makers. 
Pernicious poverty implicates every facet of society and the legal structure, but 
most obviously, poverty is about money—the lack of it, the inability to make it 
grow, and the inability to borrow it. Low-income individuals have unique 
financial needs and challenges and cannot be offered banking services as 
though they are simply rich people with less money. It is on this front that the 
U.S. banking system is failing the poor. 
A recent study found that over half the population of the United States 
would not be able to access $2,000 in thirty days to respond to an emergency.2 
Further, approximately one-in-four households in the United States (28.3%) 
are “unbanked”—meaning they have no formal relationship with a bank—or 
“underbanked”—meaning they do not have access to incremental credit.3 Thus, 
they must rely on payday lenders, check cashers, or other fringe banking 
institutions to meet their short-term credit needs. These lenders are often 
 
 
2
 An Examination of the Availability of Credit for Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 141 n.1 (2011) [hereinafter The 
Availability of Credit Hearing] (citing Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financially Fragile Households: Evidence 
and Implications (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17072, 2011)) (statement of Robert W. 
Mooney, Deputy Director, Consumer Protection and Community Affairs). 
 
3
 SUSAN BURHOUSE & YAZMIN OSAKI, FDIC, 2011 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2012). 
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usurious, sometimes predatory, and almost always much worse for low-income 
individuals than the services offered by traditional banks to their customers. 
Many scholars and policy makers agree that fringe banks have high costs 
for the poor4 and further dislocate them from traditional banking institutions by 
preventing them from building up a credit history.5 Many have advocated 
regulating such institutions or even banning them.6 Proposals include technical 
regulatory changes aimed at usurious rates,7 increased disclosure,8 and other 
consumer protection measures.9 Rather than joining the chorus of scholars 
looking to improve payday lending and check-cashing institutions, this Article 
takes a more fundamental approach: it seeks to examine the gaping hole that 
these services are currently filling. 
Throughout most of U.S. history, the credit needs of the poor were met by 
banking institutions specifically created and designed to appeal to them. Credit 
unions were a populist innovation designed to give the poor control, choice, 
and ownership over their money, with the protection of federal insurance.10 
The Savings and Loan (S&L) was created to enable middle- and working-class 
homeownership.11 Each of these institutions was designed as a cooperative: 
their defining features were common ownership and forbearance of profit.12 In 
contrast, the little-known Morris Bank was a for-profit banking venture aimed 
at the “democratization of credit,” which was envisioned as giving the poor 
access to small loans.13 Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks operated 
outside of mainstream banking and used innovative structures and products to 
meet the unique needs of the poor. Each of these banks was born of necessity, 
 
 
4
 See, e.g., JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 
7 (1994). 
 
5
 See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 124 (2004). 
 
6
 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-276 (2006); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, 
Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 858–60 (2007); Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: 
Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2012) (stating that fourteen states completely ban payday 
loans); Scott A. Hefner, Note, Payday Lending in North Carolina: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 11 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 263, 285–87 (2007). 
 
7
 Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 723, 744. 
 
8
 Mary Spector, Taming the Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended Consequences, 
57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 978–79 (2008). 
 
9
 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 5, at 129; Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit 
Regulation and the Lost Theory of Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 551 (2008); Benjamin D. Faller, Note, 
Payday Loan Solutions: Slaying the Hydra (and Keeping It Dead), 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 125, 126 (2008). 
 
10
 See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
 
11
 See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 
12
 See infra Part II.A–B. 
 
13
 See infra Part II.C. 
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eventually supported by the government, and expanded across the country. 
Each then drifted from its initial mission. 
The drift resulted in part from deregulation. Before the 1980s, the federal 
and state governments tightly controlled banking by limiting the activities 
banks could perform.14 Due to changes in both capital markets and political 
ideologies, banks began to expand their reach and activities.15 The banking 
sector quickly grew in size and scope and lobbied successfully for decreased 
government regulation.16 Credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks were caught 
up in the deregulatory atmosphere of the 1980s and started to compete with 
mainstream banks for business and customers.17 This led to a convergent 
evolution in banking. The banking framework homogenized, leaving little 
room for variation in institutional or regulatory design.18 As a result, banks 
operating outside of the dominant banking model struggled to survive. 
The market’s answer to banking for the poor—fringe banking—is 
unacceptable. What we have today are two forms of banks—regulated 
mainstream banks that seek maximum profit for their shareholders by serving 
the needs of the wealthy and middle class, and unregulated fringe banks that 
seek maximum profits for their shareholders by taking advantage of the needs 
of the poor. What is missing from the American banking landscape for the first 
time in generations is a government-sponsored bank whose main purpose is to 
meet the needs of the poor. Rather than relegating the poor to fringe banks, 
policy makers must carve out a place for banks that serve the poor and enable 
them to survive and thrive. This charge has deep historic roots in U.S. 
banking.19 
Since the inception of bank chartering in the United States until the last few 
decades, there existed an understanding that banks were “affected with a public 
interest.”20 Chartered by the state and supported by the public fisc, they were 
 
 
14
 Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking System, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 11–12 (1993). 
 
15
 See id. at 15. 
 
16
 See, e.g., Robert W. Dixon, Note, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act: Why 
Reform in the Financial Services Industry Was Necessary and the Act’s Projected Effects on Community 
Banking, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 671, 680 (2001). 
 
17
 Lee B. David, Comment, Banking—Mergers—Is Commercial Banking Still a Distinct Line of 
Commerce?, 57 TUL. L. REV. 958, 970–79 (1983). 
 
18
 Fred E. Case, Deregulation: Invitation to Disaster in the S&L Industry, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S93, S94 
(1991); see also Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a 
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 528–29, 533, 540 (1989). 
 
19
 See infra Part I. 
 
20
 Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 (Kan. 1911) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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embodied with a “public nature.”21 It is this vision of banks as public trustees 
that has disappeared. Yet, banks are still in many ways state-sponsored and 
state-supported institutions.22 Banks still rely heavily on public subsidies and 
public bailouts, yet they have been relieved of their obligation to meet certain 
public needs.23 To be clear, mainstream banks should not be forced to meet the 
needs of the poor. Nor should the needs of the poor be outsourced to them. 
Turning to banking history for insight, this Article proposes a few options 
to meet the needs of the poor that go beyond merely regulating the current 
private institutions that are “serving” these individuals. First, the Article 
explores a few existing programs that can be redesigned in order to more 
adequately serve the needs of the poor. The Article examines the shortcomings 
of legislative efforts and self-help movements by the poor and illustrates how 
these efforts can be strengthened. The second proposal calls on the federal 
government to engage in a large-scale effort to provide low-cost credit to the 
poor using the Postal Service branch network. The Postal Service has been 
enlisted before in efforts to serve the poor, and it provides efficiencies due to 
economies of scale.24 The Postal Service would offer check cashing and other 
routine and low-risk financial transactions to the poor at an interest rate that 
accurately reflects the risk of credit. 
Part I of this Article describes the current landscape of low-income 
banking, and specifically why the poor need access to banks and the damaging 
alternatives that have taken the place of mainstream institutions in poor 
communities. Part II outlines the creation, development, and eventual demise 
of three institutions aimed at meeting the needs of the poor: the credit union, 
the S&L, and the Morris Bank. Part III then examines why these institutions 
have changed and why no alternatives have replaced them. The Article 
illuminates the larger political and social shifts as well as the resulting 
regulatory changes that have led banks away from serving communities and 
toward seeking higher profits. Part IV reviews the deficiencies in ongoing 
efforts to enlist mainstream banks in serving the poor, as well as legislation 
intended to remedy the problem of access without escaping the modern market 
model of banking. This Part then makes some specific recommendations that 
 
 
21
 Id. 
 
22
 See Joe Adler, Frequently Asked Questions: Nationalize or Not? Hard to Define, Harder to Answer, 
AM. BANKER (N.Y.), Feb. 20, 2009, at 1. 
 
23
 Id. 
 
24
 See infra Part IV.D.  
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are rooted outside the mainstream banking framework and allow alternative 
banking institutions to properly meet the needs of the poor. 
I. BANKING FOR THE POOR: NEEDS AND BARRIERS 
Policy makers have always recognized that access to financial services and 
credit is a significant step toward individual economic advancement.25 Credit 
gives people the ability to absorb financial reversals, the means to start or 
expand a small business, and the capacity to build a financial safety cushion to 
withstand individual economic shocks.26 Several studies have demonstrated 
that when poor communities are provided access to credit and other banking 
services, they thrive economically.27 Studies show that small-scale credit leads 
to increased income and savings among borrowers.28 It is also true that barriers 
to credit significantly hamper the economic development of poor communities 
and individuals.29 
Access to credit is an important means by which the poor can overcome 
poverty.30 The poor need access to long-term credit such as student loans and 
 
 
25
 See Barr, supra note 5, at 134–41 (listing consequences of not having access to mainstream financial 
services); Stacie Carney & William G. Gale, Asset Accumulation Among Low-Income Households 22–23 
(Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gale/19991130.pdf 
(finding households without bank accounts 43% less likely to have positive holdings of net financial assets); 
Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Remarks Before the U.S. Conference of Mayors (Jan. 28, 
2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls356.aspx (describing individual 
access to financial services, and specifically bank accounts as the “basic passport to the broader economy”). 
 
26
 “Access to credit assures access to basic necessities for debtors who, because of un- or under-
employment, lack an adequate income to pay for essentials like food, shelter, and medicine.” Regina Austin, 
Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in 
Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2004). 
 
27
 See ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., WORLD BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL?: POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN 
EXPANDING ACCESS 138 (2008) (concluding that “the bulk of the evidence suggests financial development and 
improved access to finance is likely not only to accelerate economic growth but also to reduce income 
inequality and poverty”); Barr, supra note 5, at 127; J. Wyatt Kendall, Note, Microfinance in Rural China: 
Government Initiatives to Encourage Participation by Foreign and Domestic Financial Institutions, 12 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 375, 377 (2008) (“Researchers have demonstrated that there is a strong, positive correlation 
between an individual’s access to traditional banking services and an individual’s well-being.”). 
 
28
 DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., supra note 27, at 99; Lewis D. Solomon, Microenterprise: Human 
Reconstruction in America’s Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 199 (1992). 
 
29
 See Kendall, supra note 27, at 375 (“[P]eople with access to banking services live above the poverty 
line, whereas those without access to banking services live below the poverty line.”). 
 
30
 “Access to credit” is too broad a statement to be empirically measurable. The World Bank and various 
economists have studied this question without conclusive results as to what type of access is desirable among 
the poor. Anjali Kumar et al., Measuring Financial Access, in BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCESS 7, 14–30 (Michael S. Barr et al. eds., 2007). This Article will not delve 
into this nuanced discussion; rather, it will start with the assumption that the low-income have less access to 
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business loans, as well as short-term credit for daily and emergency needs that 
are not met by mainstream loan products. But being “banked” is not just about 
getting a loan; it is also about having a secure place to invest, building a credit 
history, and being able to avoid expensive fringe financial services. 
The poor do not have a right to be banked and I am not proposing that they 
should. However, if barriers to credit slow economic growth for the poor—and 
research seems to indicate that they do—these barriers need to be examined. 
This Article suggests that there is a market failure in providing the poor with 
access to credit due to the perceived higher risk of these borrowers and 
discrimination. In addition, small loans are not as profitable as large loans, so 
profit-maximizing institutions are not incentivized to make these loans. 
Government-sponsored organizations operating under different profit 
structures, such as mutual ownership, previously existed to fill the gap created 
by these incentives, but they are no longer available to the low-income. This 
Article examines the causes of their absence and advocates a renewed 
government initiative in banking. Providing healthy credit to the poor requires 
fewer resources than many other poverty alleviation programs because the 
state is only providing a subsidy, if needed, in absorbing some of the risks in 
lending to higher risk individuals. In addition, banking is a sector that already 
receives subsidies from the federal government, but most of those subsidies 
flow to large banks and their customers. This Article advocates for a revival of 
the concept of democratization of credit or renewed efforts to make low-cost 
credit and access to banking available to all members of society. 
 
credit than others and that the credit they are given is not as good as the types of financial products given to the 
middle and upper classes. Numerous studies of credit options for the poor support these assumptions. See, e.g., 
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2008) (explaining that 
the presence of payday loans and subprime mortgages in low-income neighborhoods is not surprising because 
they are designed to extend credit to borrowers who are denied access to traditional credit); Michael S. Barr, 
Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 517, 553 
(2005) (noting the connection between lower wealth and less access to credit); Kelly D. Edmiston, Could 
Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?, ECON. REV., First Quarter 2011, at 63, 83, available at 
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/11q1Edmiston.pdf (showing that in the absence of payday lending 
consumers in low-income counties would have limited access to credit); Michael Klausner, Market Failure 
and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1561, 1571 (1995) (“[M]arket imperfections can leave creditworthy borrowers in low-income 
neighborhoods without access to credit or with less access than they would have if markets worked 
perfectly.”). 
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A. The Costs of Fringe Banking on the Poor 
The rise of fringe banking correlates directly with the decline in 
accessibility to low-cost credit from government-sponsored banks, such as the 
credit union and S&L.31 Christopher Peterson has noted that since “[l]ow-to-
moderate income consumers have lost access to banks and credit unions since 
the late seventies, [they] have naturally moved to [fringe lenders] for their 
financial needs.”32 Fringe banking has grown exponentially since the 1980s.33 
“There are more pawnshops today, both in absolute numbers and on a per 
capita basis, than at any time in United States history.”34 Prior to the mid-
1970s, check-cashing institutions existed in only a few urban areas, but 
throughout the 1980s, these institutions rapidly expanded throughout the 
country.35 “Virtually nonexistent in this country 20 years ago, [this sector] has 
grown into a $100 billion business. Since the mid-1990s, the number of payday 
lenders nationwide has grown over 10 percent annually.”36  
The fringe banks moved into neighborhoods vacated by banks, and in turn, 
the prevalence and market dominance of predatory lenders drove remaining 
mainstream banks out of many poor communities.37 This trend has only 
accelerated in recent years as banks have increasingly closed branches in poor 
neighborhoods in order to maintain profitability. 
Fringe banking operations such as loan sharks, pawn shops, payday 
lenders, and check-cashing stores operate at high costs to the poor.38 Scholars 
repeatedly point out the danger of having the poor serviced by unregulated 
lenders and have proposed specific regulations to curtail the most egregious 
behaviors of some of these lenders.39 There are three concerns with these 
alternative financial services: (1) the costs of these services “reduce take-home 
 
 
31
 CASKEY, supra note 4, at 7. 
 
32
 CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT 
MARKET 21 (2004); see also Mann & Hawkins, supra note 6, at 857. 
 
33
 CASKEY, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 
34
 Id. at 1. 
 
35
 Id. at 1–2. 
 
36
 Joe Mahon, Tracking “Fringe Banking”, FEDGAZETTE, Sept. 2008, at 18, available at http://www. 
minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4030. 
 
37
 Richard R.W. Brooks, Essay, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 996 (2006). 
 
38
 See generally Barr, supra note 5 (discussing the high costs of alternative financial services); Lynn 
Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe 
Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 
S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) (same). 
 
39
 See, e.g., CASKEY, supra note 4, at 9–10; Barr, supra note 5. 
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pay”; (2) low-income households face barriers to saving without formal bank 
accounts; and (3) without a formal relationship with a financial institution it is 
difficult to establish a credit history.40 
Studies show that many low-income families carry a startling debt load to 
payday loan providers, often taking out loans from one fringe lender to pay off 
another.41 Once these customers enter the payday loan industry, it becomes a 
trap from which they cannot escape. The typical check-cashing outlet charges 
between 1.5% and 3.3% of a check’s face value.42 For a typical client—who 
earns approximately $18,000 per year—this amounts to nearly $500 
annually.43 For payday borrowers, total annual fees amount to nearly $600, 
with a typical client taking out approximately eleven two-week loans per year, 
at an average loan amount of $300.44 The average interest rate charged is 
usually 500%, well above both state and federal usury limits.45 Unfortunately 
such limits are easily evaded through loopholes that enable “charter renting,” 
whereby a payday lender forms a relationship with a federal bank and “the 
payday lender solicits, manages, and issues each loan, but ostensibly uses the 
federal bank’s funds in exchange for a per-loan fee.”46 The alternative financial 
service industry’s success is due to its ability to take advantage of the federally 
sponsored banking system, and it has come at the expense of poor individuals, 
many of whom, ironically, do not have access to these same government 
subsidies and protections. 
 
 
40
 Michael S. Barr, Essay, An Inclusive, Progressive National Savings and Financial Services Policy, 1 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 164 (2007). 
 
41
 See PETERSON, supra note 32; Ronald J. Mann, After the Great Recession: Regulating Financial 
Services for Low- and Middle-Income Communities, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 746–47 (2012) (discussing 
the “debt trap” of payday borrowing and its underlying causes); Skiba, supra note 6, at 1027 (“Many states 
have now banned payday lending based on the assumption that it enables borrowing behavior that leads to 
costly cycles of debt . . . .”); see also Robert Mayer, Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, and Deregulation, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 818–19 (2012) (discussing the debt trap in the context of loan sharks). 
 
42
 Barr, supra note 5, at 146–47. 
 
43
 Id. at 148; see also PETERSON, supra note 32, at 14 (“A government study indicates the average 
customer is usually a woman in her middle thirties earning just over $24,000 a year. She usually rents her 
home and once she becomes a customer of a short-term loan company she usually remains a customer for at 
least six months.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
44
 Barr, supra note 5, at 156–57. 
 
45
 Id. at 154. 
 
46
 PETERSON, supra note 32, at 12–13; see also Austin, supra note 26, at 1241 (describing bank and 
payday lender partnerships as specifically designed to take advantage of loopholes in banking law in part 
because banks are eager to have fee income). This trend, including “rent-a-charter” arrangements, has 
apparently survived the recent banking crisis, as banks and payday lenders continue to partner in payday 
lending to split the fees from such loans. See Christopher Konneker, Comment, How the Poor Are Getting 
Poorer: The Proliferation of Payday Loans in Texas via State Charter Renting, 14 SCHOLAR 489, 509–10 
(2011). 
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Some scholars and industry observers defend this fee as a justifiable 
premium deducted by these institutions to take on higher risk clients.47 
However, this is not the whole story. Many of these fees are also associated 
with relatively low- or no-risk transactions—such as the cashing of checks paid 
by the federal government or payday loans for those with a stable income. The 
profit margins can be quite large for these transactions. It is certainly true, 
however, that it costs more to give credit to the low-income and a premium 
must be extracted in those cases. This Article suggests below that lending to 
the poor is not a high-profit business, but that it is a worthy policy objective 
and government subsidies might be used in this endeavor. 
B. Barriers to Banking for the Poor 
There are a variety of barriers that keep mainstream banks from serving the 
poor, the first of which is profitability. Poor individuals may need banks, but 
the reverse is certainly not true. Most bankers and scholars agree that 
“[p]roviding financial services to the poor is fundamentally unprofitable.”48 
Banks have struggled to offer small loans to the poor because of their higher 
credit risk and the narrower profit margin on small loans. Banks incur 
approximately the same costs when originating a loan regardless of the 
principal amount,49 but they generate much greater returns from large loans. 
Moreover, mainstream commercial banks have an obligation to their 
shareholders to maximize profits and “‘should not be required to extend credit 
if sound judgment suggests undue risk.’”50 Thus, banks look up the financial 
 
 
47
 See, e.g., Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous 
Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 230–31 (2007); Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday 
Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 21 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-09, 2005), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_Samolyk.pdf 
(finding that the high prices charged by payday lenders can be justified by their costs and high default losses); 
see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 38, at 616 (“Each segment of the fringe credit market justifies its costs 
in part by its higher transaction costs and in part by the higher level of risk assumed to be associated with 
lending to fringe market borrowers.”). 
 
48
 Sow Hup Chan, An Exploratory Study of Using Micro-Credit to Encourage the Setting Up of Small 
Businesses in the Rural Sector of Malaysia, 4 ASIAN BUS. & MGMT. 455, 456 (2005). But see David 
Malmquist et al., The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending, 11 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 169, 181–82 
(1997) (noting that “low-income lending is no more and no less profitable than non-low-income lending”); 
Bruce G. Posner, Behind the Boom in Microloans, INC., Apr. 1994, at 114 (stating that “[b]anks didn’t think 
you could make money making small loans to businesses . . . . [but] are now finding that . . . microloans can be 
profitable” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
49
 Solomon, supra note 28, at 192. 
 
50
 Ivan Light & Michelle Pham, Beyond Creditworthy: Microcredit and Informal Credit in the United 
States, 3 J. DEVELOPMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 35, 37 (1998) (quoting Katharine L. Bradbury et al., 
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ladder to attract funds from corporations, pension funds, and high-net-worth 
individuals, while unregulated fringe bankers meet the needs of the poor. This 
tendency has created two banking systems in America: a government-
subsidized, mainstream banking system for the rich and an unregulated, 
alternative banking system for the poor. 
C. Discrimination and Redlining 
Discrimination and redlining also limit the poor’s access to banks. 
Compounding the problems with profitability in serving the poor, studies show 
that there is discrimination in banking where loans are denied to creditworthy 
individuals simply due to their race.51 Because many of the unbanked and 
underbanked are also people of color, this has exacerbated their problem of 
access. Other studies show that minorities are also offered worse financial 
products than whites.52 Moreover, banks often engage in redlining, which 
refers to the practice of drawing a red line through certain neighborhoods and 
refusing to lend there due to historic poverty, racism, or lack of adequate 
collateral.53 The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), discussed below in Part 
IV, attempts to remedy these problems.54 
Some policy makers and scholars have given up trying to force banks to 
meet the needs of the poor, claiming that cost considerations prevent delivery 
of services in some markets.55 Frustrated, some claim that “banks’ potential for 
service improvement [to the poor] is modest even were they run by God’s 
 
Geographic Patterns of Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982–1987, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 
3, 3). 
 
51
 See id. at 38 (“Results [from a Boston Federal Reserve Bank study] showed that blacks and Hispanics 
were 56% more likely than non-minorities to be denied a mortgage loan net of creditworthiness.”); Michele L. 
Johnson, Casenote, Your Loan Is Denied, but What About Your Lending Discrimination Suit?: Latimore v. 
Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 151 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1998), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 192–94 (1999); see also 
Shahien Nasiripour, Wells Fargo Target of Justice Department Probe; Agency Alleges Discriminatory 
Lending, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/26/wells-fargo-justice-department-
probe_n_910425.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2011, 6:12 AM). See generally Helen F. Ladd, Evidence on 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 41 (concluding that lending data made 
available through various legislation shows clear discrimination in mortgage lending against minorities); 
Natasha Lennard, Did Wells Fargo Prey on Black Borrowers?, SALON (July 27, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://www. 
salon.com/2011/07/27/wells_fargo_preyed_on_black_borrowers_lawsuit/. 
 
52
 Lennard, supra note 51; Nasiripour, supra note 51. 
 
53
 Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 851 n.26 (1999). 
 
54
 See id. at 852. 
 
55
 See, e.g., Malmquist et al., supra note 48, at 181–82; Posner, supra note 48, at 114; cf. Barr, supra note 
5, at 183 (discussing the perceived low profitability of banking the poor); Barr, supra note 30, at 528 
(discussing the criticism that the “CRA forces banks to engage in unprofitable, risky lending”). 
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angels.”56 Banks do not have to be run by “God’s angels” to properly serve the 
poor—but they must be run in a different way than most banks are today.57 
Banking history shows a variety of examples of banks that successfully met the 
needs of the poor while operating outside the mainstream model. 
D. The Facade of Informality 
Even when banks remain geographically available, they are often out of 
reach. Due to various regulatory measures, mainstream banks require extensive 
documentation, such as utility bills, a driver’s license, and a Social Security 
number or alien documentation number, in order to open an account.58 
Providing this documentation can be a significant barrier to banking for many 
in contrast to the ease by which they can access funds from fringe banks. In 
addition, many of the American poor who are immigrants or uneducated often 
do not speak English, may be illiterate, or have significant information barriers 
to traditional banking structures.59 There are also intangible barriers of class 
and culture. When the poor have been asked about using fringe banks rather 
than mainstream banks, many claim that they are “not comfortable” dealing 
with banks.60 
Thus, mainstream banking has abandoned poor areas by shutting down 
branches and also by failing to speak the financial language of the poor. 
Payday lending businesses operate behind a facade of informality. These 
lenders operate in cash, at all hours, on a short-term basis, in the direct vicinity 
of their customers, and usually in their language.61 This business model seems 
 
 
56
 Light & Pham, supra note 50, at 39. 
 
57
 Id. 
 
58
 See Barr, supra note 5, at 184. 
 
59
 See id. at 183–84 (describing the lack of financial education as a barrier to becoming banked for at 
least a segment of the low-income population); Check Cashers: Moving from the Fringes to the Financial 
Mainstream, COMMUNITIES & BANKING, Summer 1999, at 2, 9 (explaining that while banks may “offer 
information about their services in various languages, bank staff may not be fluent in an immigrant’s native 
language”); cf. Michael A. Satz, How the Payday Predator Hides Among Us: The Predatory Nature of the 
Payday Loan Industry and Its Use of Consumer Arbitration to Further Discriminatory Lending Practices, 20 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 123, 149 (2010) (“The typical payday loan customer has a below-average 
education and may not even speak English.”). 
 
60
 Barr, supra note 5, at 180 n.282 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“About 18% of unbanked 
respondents to surveys reported that they were not ‘comfortable’ dealing with banks.”); accord Arthur B. 
Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 9–11 (2000). 
 
61
 See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages 
Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 13 (2003) (“Focus groups of low-income and ethnic 
consumers . . . identif[y] five ways in which check cashers were superior to banks: (a) easier access to 
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to be in direct contrast to banks with their rigid hours, requirements, fees, and 
procedures. Surveys reveal that many low-income individuals feel “[s]nubbed” 
by mainstream financial institutions and are “more pride-conscious than price-
conscious and are therefore susceptible to the appeal of the secondary sector’s 
‘merchandising of respect.’”62 
Despite the informal facade, fringe banks are highly profitable corporations 
whose rigid practices come into play as soon as debts become due. These 
businesses resort to intimidation, harassment, and legal process in order to 
collect payments.63 By mimicking informal markets, these fringe banks have 
convinced their customers that they are operating in the informal realm, but 
their debt collection practices are quite formal and inflexible. As one 
commentator observed about a Washington, D.C. check-cashing outlet, “The 
primitive hands-on processing and tawdry exterior of the outlets both exude 
welcome to poor customers and mask [the firm’s] close ties to and substantial 
financing from large corporations and big banks.”64 
E. Democratization of Credit? 
The payday lending industry claims that it is serving the needs of the poor 
and promoting the democratization of credit.65 However, this industry does not 
provide credit that is productive to poor individuals. The poor are often in 
greater debt after their interactions with payday lenders than before.66 The 
industry, instead of being an aid to lift the poor out of poverty, buries them 
 
immediate cash; (b) more accessible locations; (c) better service in the form of shorter lines, more tellers, more 
targeted product mix in a single location, convenient operating hours, and Spanish-speaking tellers; (d) more 
respectful, courteous treatment of customers; and (e) greater trustworthiness.”). 
 
62
 Austin, supra note 26, at 1249 (quoting ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 202 (2000)). 
 
63
 PETERSON, supra note 32, at 16. 
 
64
 Brett Williams, What’s Debt Got to Do with It?, in THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES: THE ETHNOGRAPHY 
OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 79, 87 (Judith Goode & Jeff 
Maskovsky eds., 2001). 
 
65
 See Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Culture, 7 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 335 (2006) (noting payday lenders’ portrayal of their products as promoting 
the democratization of credit); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Predatory Mortgage Lending: Summary of Legislative 
and Regulatory Activity, Including Testimony on Subprime Mortgage Lending Before the House Banking 
Committee, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 2001, at 9, 40 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. B0-00ZV, 2001) (describing testimony before the House Banking Committee). 
 
66
 See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes. 
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further in debt.67 “[T]he true democratization of credit . . . should foster the 
enhanced well-being for the least well-off borrowers.”68 
What low-income individuals need are flexible, informal banks that operate 
in their neighborhoods and are able to communicate in both their spoken and 
cultural languages. It is not implausible to imagine a less harmful institution 
that could serve the poor in the same way as fringe banks by understanding and 
meeting their needs. A 2008 report describing the financial conditions of the 
poor in New York City stated that “[t]here is a fundamental mismatch between 
current financial product and service offerings and the needs of households in 
these communities,”69 which is the primary reason banks are not reaching the 
unbanked.70 The underbanked make up 28% of the U.S. population and 
continue to grow, and their primary need is short-term financing.71 
As discussed below, when unique barriers to serving the poor have arisen 
in the past, specialized banking institutions created innovative products to meet 
those needs. In order to meet the needs of the poor today, institutions will need 
to overcome the documentation, language, and cultural barriers of the poor and 
operate in their neighborhoods. As discussed below, the government, through 
the vast branching network of the United States Postal Service, could 
potentially offer the true democratization of credit. Postal branches operate in 
every zip code and are both familiar and accessible to the poor. The 
government could launch a program to offer short-term, low-cost credit options 
through the Postal Service. Indeed, “[w]e live in a real-time economy. Banks 
have more than enough technological horsepower and data on consumer 
behavior patterns to cash paychecks with little to no risk.”72 The government 
could offer many—if not all—of the products that fringe banks currently offer 
at a lower cost. 
 
 
67
 See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes. 
 
68
 Austin, supra note 26, at 1257. 
 
69
 OFFICE OF FIN. EMPOWERMENT, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, NEIGHBORHOOD FINANCIAL 
SERVICES STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN TWO NEW YORK CITY NEIGHBORHOODS 24 
(2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ofe/downloads/pdf/NFS_Compiled.pdf. 
 
70
 Id. 
 
71
 Jennifer Tescher, Underbanked, Under Banks’ Radar, AM. BANKER (N.Y.), Apr. 28, 2011, at 8 (noting 
that an “FDIC study showed that the nonbank products and services used most frequently by underbanked 
households are money orders (81%) and check cashing (30%)”). 
 
72
 Id. 
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II. WHEN THE POOR HAD BANKS 
At the inception of banking in the United States, there was recognition that 
banks were an instrumental state entity and that they were to be used to benefit 
the “common people.”73 Thus, state and national governments employed banks 
to further government objectives.74 Many of the first state banks were 
chartered to meet the credit needs of farmers, planters, and mechanics who 
lacked access to the First Bank of the United States.75 
During the industrial era, the nation’s banks expanded, which resulted in an 
accumulation of power to those with access to bank funds and a growing 
discomfort for those without access.76 During the nineteenth century, as 
American industrialists were getting richer and the economy was expanding 
with the help of bank financing, a growing number of poor Americans 
clamored to be included in the banking sector. During the 1800s, an 
organization that was first called the “Knights of Reliance” and later “the 
Farmers’ Alliance” was formed in Texas to oppose the concentration of 
banking in the East and the power of Wall Street.77 This populist movement 
advocated farming cooperatives across the country that were not beholden to 
Eastern banks.78 Cooperatives were mutually owned and controlled financial 
institutions in which poor farmers pooled their resources and supported each 
other’s ventures.79 
The Progressives embraced these alternative banks and advocated the 
democratization of credit, or the extension of credit, to the working poor.80 In 
response to these political movements by the poor that intensified during the 
Progressive Era and the Great Depression, credit unions and the S&L were 
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 SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 43 (2001). 
 
74
 Id. at 72. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1203–04 
(1986). 
 
77
 Id.; Donald A. Lash, The Community Development Banking Act and the Evolution of Credit Allocation 
Policies, 7 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 385, 386–87 (1998); see also JOHN D. HICKS, 
THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY 108–09 (1931). 
 
78
 ROBERT GUTTMANN, HOW CREDIT-MONEY SHAPES THE ECONOMY: THE UNITED STATES IN A GLOBAL 
SYSTEM 68, 76–78 (1994); Rabin, supra note 76, at 1202–03 (describing the attempt of the Farmers’ Alliance 
to promote a cooperative effort and its eventual defeat at the hands of the powerful banking system). 
 
79
 See HICKS, supra note 77, at 132–34. 
 
80
 JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR 
TO MICHAEL MILKEN 76–110 (1992). 
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created.81 The farming cooperatives provided the model for the credit union 
industry.82 
In addition to these formal institutions, there were several other banking 
ventures aimed at helping poor individuals. The Provident Loan Society, 
established in 1894 with $100,000 provided by the richest men in New York 
City,83 was a charitable organization that aimed to “relieve distress through 
enlightened and liberal lending but also, through competition, to force lower 
margins on profit-making pawnbrokers.”84 By 1919, it was making more loans 
than any domestic savings bank with a policy “first, to make small and costly 
loans and, only second, to make large and profitable ones. It made loans of as 
little as one dollar [that required minimal collateral].”85 The fund’s humanity 
was in stark contrast to the pawnbrokers at the time, but due to the nature of 
the bank’s loans, “[t]he truly indigent, almost by definition, were excluded, as 
they had nothing to pawn.”86 
In 1873, President Grant’s Postmaster General proposed a government-
sponsored savings program modeled after one started in Britain.87 A few years 
later, President Taft responded to growing populist proposals to establish a 
government-backed savings system for recent immigrants and the poor.88 The 
Postal Savings System enabled the poor to save money with the assurance of a 
government guarantee.89 These savings accounts were created and geared to 
recent immigrants and the unbanked poor,90 and they were widely successful—
at the end of the first year, there was a total of $20 million in deposits, “most of 
which had been coaxed out of hiding.”91 The Post Office Inspector, Carter 
Keene, declared in 1913 that the Postal Savings System was not meant to yield 
a profit: 
Its aim is infinitely higher and more important. Its mission is to 
encourage thrift and economy among all classes of citizens. It stands 
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 See 80 CONG. REC. 6753 (1936). 
 
82
 Lash, supra note 77, at 386–87. 
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 GRANT, supra note 80, at 77, 85. 
 
84
 Id. at 85. 
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 Id. at 87. 
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 Id. at 87–88. 
 
89
 Id. at 90; Postal Savings System, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (July 2008), http://about.usps.com/who-we-are/ 
postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf. 
 
90
 Postal Savings System, supra note 89. 
 
91
 GRANT, supra note 80, at 90. 
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for good citizenship and tends to diminish crime. It places savings 
facilities at the very doors of those living in remote sections, and it 
also affords opportunity for safeguarding the savings of thousands 
who have absolute confidence in the Government and will trust no 
other institution.92 
Throughout American history, there have been various state-supported 
attempts to meet the banking needs of the poor. The following sections outline 
the history of three banking institutions that were created for the poor and their 
eventual abandonment of their mission. Interestingly, all of these banks 
changed roughly at the same time—in the 1980s. The causes of this collective 
change in banking will be examined at length below. These banks shared 
several common traits: they were born of necessity to meet the needs of the 
poor, they formed special charters that were different from mainstream banks 
and were embraced by the law, they each drifted from their founding mission 
to serve the poor and started to compete with other banks, and they were each 
deregulated in order to compete with mainstream banks. None of these banks 
operated at a large profit, but that was not the point of their charters. Today, all 
of these banks maintain profit margins rivaling mainstream banks and are 
marketing their products to wealthy individuals. 
A. Credit Unions 
1. Born of Necessity 
Credit unions started as a populist mechanism designed to empower 
farmers against bad loans that kept them indebted to bankers.93 Farmers needed 
credit to run their businesses, but their source of credit was typically confined 
to traditional banks that were based in major cities like New York and 
Boston.94 As the crop failures and financial woes of the 1920s took their toll on 
farms across the country, farmers quickly became heavily indebted to these 
outside banks and often lost their equipment, land, and livelihood.95 This 
quickly led to a populist sentiment that resulted in farmers organizing a 
 
 
92
 Id. 
 
93
 See Rabin, supra note 76, at 1203–04 (detailing the Farmers’ Alliance plan to have the federal 
government issue credit for the farmers’ crops to effectively eliminate private funding). 
 
94
 Id.; see Lee J. Alston, Wayne A. Grove & David C. Wheelock, Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence from the 
1920s, 31 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 409, 415–18 (1994); Julie Andersen Hill, Bailouts and Credit 
Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the Farm Credit System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 10–16. 
 
95
 See Rabin, supra note 76, at 1202–03. 
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grassroots campaign to start credit unions.96 Credit unions were envisioned as a 
way to cut out the middleman—commercial banks—and give farmers access to 
lower cost credit.97 
Thus, the proliferation of credit unions in the United States came in 
response to the Great Depression.98 Previously, banks had made their services 
available mostly to corporations and wealthy individuals, disregarding lower 
income individuals.99 This practice left underserved groups susceptible to 
exploitation. Loan companies would often charge up to the maximum interest 
rate allowed by law, while installment buying would exploit those in need of 
credit through “confusing rate schedules and discount schemes.”100 Those 
unwilling or unable to navigate these legal alternatives to banks were forced to 
turn to loan sharks who would extract “up to a thousand percent” in interest 
rates.101 These high interest rates reduced purchasing power among the poorer 
classes, which in turn contributed to the economic malaise of the times.102 
Specifically, credit unions provided a method of lending in which farmers 
and rural populations were organized into credit groups.103 Within these 
groups, those with excess money would make deposits from which the other 
local residents could receive loans.104 The borrowers would then repay the 
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 See 80 CONG. REC. 6752 (1936). 
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 See Fred Galves, The Discriminatory Impact of Traditional Lending Criteria: An Economic and Moral 
Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1479 n.18 (1999) (“Perhaps the most remarkable success story, 
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sprang from the . . . public spirited impulse . . . to facilitate the supply of consumer credit to workers, farmers, 
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(alterations in original) (quoting JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND 
REGULATION 28–29 (2d ed. 1997))); Kelly Culp, Comment, Banks v. Credit Unions: The Turf Struggle for 
Consumers, 53 BUS. LAW. 193, 193–94 (1997). 
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 80 CONG. REC. 6753 (1936) (showing that the number of credit unions grew from 257 in 1925 to 1,017 
in 1930 and to 4,000 in 1935, and that credit union membership grew from 292,800 members in 1930 to 
1,000,000 members in 1935). 
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 See History of Credit Unions, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., http://www.ncua.gov/about/history/ 
Pages/CUHistory.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 
100
 80 CONG. REC. 6752 (1936); see also 78 CONG. REC. 7260 (1934) (comments of Sen. Sheppard). 
Senator Sheppard recounted the story of a man earning $40 per week who undertook an installment purchase 
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loans when they were financially able to do so.105 Joining a group required 
recommendation from one’s neighbors and entitled one to deposit, borrow, and 
vote on the operation of the bank under a “one-man one-vote” system.106 
Borrowers would receive loans “for productive or provident purposes upon 
security that the fellow credit unionists thought adequate.”107 Interest paid on 
loans was kept low, even though it was a credit union’s sole source of 
income.108 
2. An Innovative Response 
The early credit unions were able to overcome the high costs associated 
with lending to the poor, such as risk of delinquency, through group 
supervision. There was a requirement that there be a “common bond” among 
credit union members,109 which was aimed at reducing the cost of credit and 
the chance of delinquency because members knew each other.110 By design, 
loan repayment was limited to two years, and the maximum interest rate 
chargeable was 1% per month.111 The credit union’s innovative response to 
high-cost credit was to use personal knowledge of an applicant as a proxy for 
the high interest usually used to offset the risk of lending to the low-income.112 
The common bond requirement served several important purposes. 
Primarily, it was a substitute for the members’ lack of credit history and 
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National Credit Union Administration). 
 
110
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Credit Union Admin., 863 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1994) (“The original purpose behind the common bond 
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Union Admin., 90 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aff’d, 522 U.S. 479 (1998); cf. 78 CONG. REC. 7259–60 (1934) 
(comments of Sen. Barkley and Sen. Sheppard). 
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collateral that traditional banks required to issue loans.113 Congress intended 
the common bond among the members of a credit union to create “a cohesive 
association in which the members are known by the officers and by each other 
in order to ‘ensure both that those making lending decisions would know more 
about applicants and that borrowers would be more reluctant to default.’”114 
Such a cohesive association theoretically allowed “credit unions, unlike banks, 
[to] ‘loan on character.’”115 The common bond made federal credit unions 
distinctly tailored to serve the needs of lower income individuals. 
3. Embraced by the Law 
These initial credit unions later served as the catalyst for the Massachusetts 
Credit Union Act of 1909,116 the first state credit union act, which later served 
as the basis for the Federal Credit Union Act.117 The majority of states passed 
laws supporting the establishment of credit unions during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century.118 Congress passed the Federal Credit Union 
Act (FCUA) in 1934,119 stating that the Act addressed a “great national 
problem”120 and noting the “very extraordinary” and “highly successful” 
 
 
113
 See First Nat’l Bank, 863 F. Supp. at 10 (“The original purpose behind the common bond provision 
was twofold: to insure the financial stability of credit unions by providing a sense of cohesiveness among 
members and by enabling the members to establish a borrower’s credit worthiness at minimum cost; and to 
promote the growth of credit unions because it was faster and easier to form a credit union with members who 
already had a common bond.”); cf. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 988 F.2d at 1275 (“[T]he very notion [that 
Congress intended the common bond requirement to protect banks against competition from credit unions] 
seems anomalous because Congress’ general purpose was to encourage the proliferation of credit unions, 
which were expected to provide service to those would-be customers that banks disdained.”). 
 
114
 First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 90 F.3d 525, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 988 F.2d at 1276), aff’d, 522 U.S. 479 (1998); cf. D’Amours Statement, 
supra note 109, at 12 (“[The] common bond [requirement] then was an organization mechanism for credit 
unions and an early standard of safety and soundness. It was never the defining characteristic of credit 
unions.”). 
 
115
 First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 988 F.2d at 1276 (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 12,223 (1934) (comments of 
Rep. Steagall)). 
 
116
 Massachusetts Credit Union Act of 1909, ch. 419, 1909 Mass. Acts 392. 
 
117
 78 CONG. REC. 7259 (1934); see also id. at 12,224 (comments of Rep. Blanchard) (noting that 
“Massachusetts and other States have excellent laws on credit unions”). 
 
118
 Id. at 7260 (comments of Sen. Sheppard) (noting that only ten states did not have credit-union laws by 
this point). 
 
119
 Federal Credit Union Act, ch. 750, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.). 
 
120
 78 CONG. REC. 7259 (1934) (comments of Sen. Sheppard). 
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record of credit unions in addressing the “legitimate credit” needs of “the 
poorer and working classes” throughout the Great Depression.121 
As originally passed, the FCUA required that credit union members elect 
management, with each member having one vote122 as well as the ability to 
purchase shares and receive loans.123 Membership in a credit union was 
“limited to groups having a common bond of occupation, or association, or to 
groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.”124 
While initially subject to taxation just like other banking institutions,125 
concern arose that subjecting credit unions to the same taxation as commercial 
banks would place “a disproportionate and excessive burden on the credit 
unions.”126 Responding to this concern, Congress, three years after initially 
passing the FCUA, amended the statute by extending significant tax 
exemptions to credit unions.127 
The tax exemptions were a critical government subsidy that allowed credit 
unions to continue to provide low-cost services. As a result of these provisions, 
the credit union industry grew dramatically after the Great Depression.128 
Specifically, from 1945 to 1966 the number of credit unions grew from 8,683 
holding $435 million in funds, to more than 23,000 holding in excess of $11.5 
billion in funds.129 Additionally, these federally chartered credit unions were 
 
 
121
 Id. at 7259−61 (noting that credit unions “came through the depression practically without runs or 
failures”). 
 
122
 Federal Credit Union Act §§ 10, 11(b). 
 
123
 Id. § 7(6)–(7). 
 
124
 Id. § 9. 
 
125
 Id. § 18. 
 
126
 82 CONG. REC. 358 (1937) (statement of Rep. Steagall). 
 
127
 Federal Credit Union Act Amendments, ch. 3, 51 Stat. 4, 4 (1937) (amending section 18 of the Federal 
Credit Union Act). Results from some recent studies suggest that traditional banking institutions would need to 
earn 40% more than a credit union to achieve the same level of retained earnings due to the tax exemption. See 
Donald Novajovsky, Note, From National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust to the 
Revised Federal Credit Union Act: The Debate over Membership Requirements in the Credit Union Industry, 
44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 221, 227 (2000). This was the first of a series of alterations to the federal credit union 
structure dealing with safety and soundness. In 1970, Congress created the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund, a deposit insurance backed by the Treasury, analogous to the FDIC. See Act of Oct. 19, 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 203(a), 84 Stat. 994, 999–1000 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1783 (2006)). In 
1998, as part of the Credit Union Membership Access Act, Congress imposed heightened risk-based capital 
requirements on credit unions. See Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, § 301(a), 112 
Stat. 913, 923–31 (1998) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1790d (2006)); 12 C.F.R. § 702 (1998). 
 
128
 See Novajovsky, supra note 127, at 224 (citing HERMAN E. KROOSS & MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY 
OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 241–42 (1971)). In 1930, there were 1,100 credit unions in the United States; 
by 1960 there were over 10,000. History of Credit Unions, supra note 99. 
 
129
 See Novajovsky, supra note 127, at 224 (citing KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 128, at 241–42). 
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indeed serving the underserved, working-class families that needed credit to 
expand and succeed.130 
4. Credit Unions Drift from Their Initial Mission 
Credit unions slowly began to shift from being a resource for poor 
Americans to competing with other banks for the business of the middle class. 
Credit unions were caught up in the broader changes in banking and faced 
internal as well as external pressure to compete with other banks and seek 
higher profits. Credit unions started losing customers to unregulated entities 
due to their regulatory burdens, such as the common bond requirement and the 
interest rate limitations—the very things that enabled them to serve the poor.131 
These forces created pressure on the credit union industry to seek deregulation 
and offer more attractive interest rates to its customers who had a growing 
number of investment options.132 
In 1970, the industry sought to completely overhaul its charter and adopt 
less restrictive requirements, leading Congress to amend the FCUA.133 Thus, 
credit unions started to focus on attracting more customers and expanding the 
industry in order to stay viable among the different banking alternatives. The 
process of expansion and deregulation led to a change of mission. Credit 
unions were no longer about poverty alleviation; they were now a desirable 
alternative for middle-class investment. 
 
 
130
 William R. Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, Credit Unions and the Common Bond, 81 REV. 41, 43 
(1999) (“Historically, members of credit unions were drawn from groups that were underserved by traditional 
private financial institutions; these consumers tended to have below-average incomes or were otherwise not 
sought out by banks.”). 
 
131
 See The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications for Consumers and the FTC: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Michael Barr, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, 
United States Treasury Department) (“Credit unions and community banks with straightforward credit 
products struggled to compete with less-scrupulous providers who appeared to offer a good deal and then 
pulled a switch on the consumer.”); Amanda Masset, Note, The Evolution of the Common Bond in 
Occupational Credit Unions: How Close Must the Tie that Binds Be?, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 387, 399 (1999) 
(stating that credit unions are better able to compete with commercial banks after the enactment of the Credit 
Union Membership Access Act that expanded the number of people eligible to join a federal credit union). 
 
132
 HOFFMAN, supra note 73, at 204 (“[Americans’] savings—not worth banks’ bother in 1930—became 
the object of vigorous competition among banks, S&Ls, and, later, the new money market mutual funds.”). 
 
133
 Id. 
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5. Deregulation 
The mantra of banking regulation in the 1970s was increased 
competition,134 and credit unions wanted to join.135 They started offering 
market-oriented products to attract and keep customers.136 However, their 
ability to compete was hampered by regulatory burdens, such as the common 
bond requirement, that kept them from freely courting customers. Eventually, 
the industry sought to relax the common bond requirement—its defining 
characteristic—to include multiple groups of people.137 
As credit unions shifted their focus to compete with banks for the funds of 
the middle class, a debate ensued over the common bond requirement, and the 
requirement came to represent the competitive advantage of banks vis-à-vis 
credit unions. As the economic recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
worsened, the National Credit Union Association (NCUA) undertook a 
reexamination of the common bond requirement.138 In an effort to help credit 
unions compete with banks, the NCUA issued an interpretive statement stating 
that credit union memberships could include multiple occupational groups as 
long as each group had a common bond.139 This dilution of the common bond 
requirement naturally led to increased credit union size, services, and 
competitive advantage.140 
 
 
134
 Clifford L. Fry & Donald R. House, Economic Issues in the Defense of Directors and Officers of 
Financial Institutions, 110 BANKING L.J. 542, 546 (1993). 
 
135
 JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 97-548 E, SHOULD CREDIT UNIONS BE TAXED? 1, 7 
(2005) (describing how the National Credit Union Association issued a series of administrative rulings that 
allowed multi-group federal credit unions and, consequently, allowed credit unions to be more competitive). 
 
136
 See id.  
 
137
 The National Credit Union Administration began this process in 1982 by issuing Interpretive Ruling 
and Policy Statement 82-1, Membership in Federal Credit Unions, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,775 (Apr. 20, 1982). It was 
later replaced by Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 82-3, Membership in Federal Credit Unions, 47 
Fed. Reg. 26,808 (June 22, 1982), which further expanded the common bond requirement. 
 
138
 Membership in Federal Credit Unions, 47 Fed. Reg. at 26,808. 
 
139
 Id. 
 
140
 After this expansive interpretation, the membership in credit unions increased by 30% from 1982 until 
1998. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment Act, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
331, 331 n.1 (2000); see also Brief for Petitioners, Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 
522 U.S. 479 (1998) (Nos. 96-843, 96-847), 1997 WL 245673, at *10. The number of credit unions grew 
fourfold from 1982 until the mid-1990s and combined to control nearly $330 billion in funds from 70 million 
members. See Dean Foust, Clipping the Wings of Credit Unions, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 25, 1996), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1996-08-25/clipping-the-wings-of-credit-unions. This growth has been 
primarily attributed to attracting customers from outside the typical common bond requirement. For example, 
nearly two-thirds of all the members in the AT&T Family Federal Credit Union do not work for AT&T and are 
considered outside of the company. Id. 
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The Supreme Court held, however, that the industry could not change its 
defining trait unilaterally.141 The Court struck down this broad interpretation of 
the common bond under a Chevron analysis in National Credit Union 
Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co. in 1998.142 In swift 
response, the NCUA and the credit union industry began lobbying Congress 
for an amendment to the FCUA allowing for diversification. The NCUA’s 
lobbying efforts focused on the preservation of the freedom of financial choice 
for Americans.143 The freedom to choose credit unions over traditional banks 
gained some traction in Congress partly due to the fact that most credit union 
members were now in the middle class and credit unions had turned into a 
formidable lobby.144 
Six months after the Supreme Court’s decision in National Credit Union 
Administration,145 Congress passed the Credit Union Membership Access Act 
(CUMAA)146 with near unanimous support to “ratify the longstanding policy 
of the [NCUA] with regard to [the] field of membership [in] Federal credit 
unions” by “specifically authoriz[ing] multiple common bond federal credit 
unions.”147 CUMAA was considered necessary to ensure that customers 
continued to have a broad array of choices in financial services.148 One of the 
Act’s most significant features was the exemption of credit unions from the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), an Act aimed at providing banking 
 
 
141
 First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479. 
 
142
 Id. 
 
143
 D’Amours Statement, supra note 109, at 15–16. 
 
144
 Cassity, supra note 140, at 344 (“Even before the Supreme Court decision was announced, . . . . it was 
almost inevitable that . . . Congress would amend the FCUA . . . . [T]he typical credit union member—
educated, middle-class, mortgage-owning—is also the average voter.” (footnote omitted)); see also The 
Supreme Court’s February 25, 1998 Decision Regarding the Credit Union Common Bond Requirement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 15–16 (1998) (statement of Paul 
Kanjorski, Rep., H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs.). Bankers still complain about the credit union lobby and 
its power. See, e.g., Stacy Kaper, CUs’ Deal on Mortgage Bill Irks Bankers, AM. BANKER (N.Y.), Feb. 26, 
2008, at 1. 
 
145
 See Eileen Canning, House Passes Credit Union Bill; Measure Headed for White House, Bloomberg 
Banking Daily (BNA) (Aug. 5, 1998). 
 
146
 Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, 112 Stat. 913 (1998) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 
147
 H.R. REP. NO. 105-472, at 1, 18 (1998); see also Cassity, supra note 140, at 345 n.92 (noting that the 
CUMAA passed 411–8 in the House and 96–2 in the Senate). 
 
148
 See Alex D. McElroy, Clinton Signs Credit Union Bill; NCUA to Begin Implementing Law Soon, 
Bloomberg Banking Daily (BNA) (Aug. 11, 1998); see also Credit Union Membership Access Act §§ 1–2. 
Representative Vento also noted that “[b]y . . . allowing multiple common-bond credit unions, we are 
revamping and facilitating the federal credit union law and empowering credit unions to adapt to the 1990’s 
market place.” 144 CONG. REC. 18,730 (1998) (statement of Rep. Vento). 
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access to low-income individuals.149 The exemption was a direct result of 
credit union lobbying. 
Because of the seemingly rushed nature of the CUMAA,150 there were 
many inconsistencies in the Act. Specifically, although Congress imposed 
numeric membership requirements that sought to limit the growth of multiple-
common-bond credit unions, the limits were easily subverted and led to an 
increase in credit union membership.151 Moreover, Congress did not answer 
the glaring contradiction raised initially by the court of appeals regarding an 
expansive, multiple-common-bond interpretation, namely how unrelated 
members and groups can adequately determine and evaluate the 
creditworthiness of the additional members.152 The Act also did nothing to 
assuage the banking industry’s fears that credit unions were acting essentially 
like banks without having to pay taxes or comport with the requirements of the 
CRA. 
Today, credit unions are much like mainstream banks. The American 
Banking Association (ABA) has continually argued that credit unions are not 
fulfilling their mission to serve the underserved.153 Buttressing the ABA’s 
claim is a GAO report, which concluded that credit unions are more likely to 
serve middle and upper income people than lower income people.154 Indeed, 
credit union expansion allowed them to compete with banks while enjoying 
 
 
149
 See also Credit Union Membership Access Act § 203. 
 
150
 See Cassity, supra note 140, at 345 n.91. 
 
151
 The current statute allows “fifty 3,000 member groups [to] come together . . . [with a] net growth to 
the institution [of] 150,000 members.” However, the statute does not allow “three 50,000 member groups” for 
a net growth of 150,000. Because there are more smaller groups than larger groups it is likely that this will 
increase the membership in credit unions. Novajovsky, supra note 127, at 243. 
 
152
 First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 90 F.3d 525, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 
aff’d, 522 U.S. 479 (1998); First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 988 F.2d 1272, 1276 
(D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 
153
 George Cleland, Bank-like Credit Unions Should Face Bank-like Taxes, ABA BANKING J., Jan. 1989, 
at 14 (explaining that the origin of the federal credit unions as self-help cooperatives with members sharing a 
common bond had been rejected for a more inclusive, profitable cooperative); Walter A. Dods, Jr., This Is a 
Common Bond?, ABA BANKING J., July 1997, at 17 (stating that “the typical credit union member is more 
likely to have above-average income and be college-educated and a homeowner—not low-income and 
underserved by banks”). 
 
154
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-29, CREDIT UNIONS: GREATER TRANSPARENCY 
NEEDED ON WHO CREDIT UNIONS SERVE AND ON SENIOR EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 5, 8 
(2006) [hereinafter GAO, CREDIT UNIONS]. According to a 1996 study done by the Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA), credit union members had an average household income of $43,480, whereas non-
members had an average income of $31,660—a difference of 37%. Culp, supra note 97, at 213. And according 
to the American Banking Association, “[C]redit union members have more years of education and are more 
likely to be employed full-time.” Id. at 213 n.161. 
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advantageous tax and other regulatory and statutory exemptions, which taken 
together created an uneven playing field. Notably, some even claim that credit 
unions “‘come in and cherry-pick the most profitable [banking] business and 
then give nothing back to the community,’”155 a practice far from the original 
objectives of the Depression Era cooperatives.156 
6. Community Development Credit Unions 
Despite the credit union industry’s general movement away from its 
original objectives, there still exist credit unions specifically designed to 
service low- and moderate-income groups and communities. One such 
organization, the National Federation of Community Development Credit 
Unions, was organized in the 1970s “to strengthen those credit unions that 
serve low-income, urban and rural communities.”157 Credit unions with a focus 
on the poor call themselves “community development credit unions” 
(CDCU).158 However, many of these credit unions have struggled to survive.159 
Despite their struggles to remain viable, some of these credit unions have 
proved at least somewhat successful in fulfilling their missions. One study of 
New York City’s Lower East Side People’s Federal Credit Union showed that 
the vast majority of the credit union’s borrowers were low-income minorities 
with little or no credit and no relationship with mainstream financial 
institutions.160 Moreover, loans were small—$1,700 on average—and for 
 
 
155
 See Foust, supra note 140 (quoting Joe G. Howard, senior vice president at First National Bank & 
Trust Company in Asheboro, North Carolina). 
 
156
 Id. 
 
157
 About Us, NAT’L FED’N COMMUNITY DEV. CREDIT UNIONS, http://www.natfed.org/i4a/pages/index. 
cfm?pageid=256 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 
158
 Id. 
 
159
 See Letter from Debbie Matz, Chairman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin., to Federally-Insured Credit 
Unions (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter NCUA Letter] (regarding the supervising of low-income credit unions and 
community development credit unions). Some estimates place the CDCU failure rate during the 1990s near 
50%. Charles D. Tansey, Community Development Credit Unions: An Emerging Player in Low Income 
Communities, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/09metropolitanpolicy_ 
tansey.aspx. Statutory and regulatory efforts have been made to assist these credit unions in fulfilling their 
mission. See Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial Institutions: Current Issues and Future 
Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 178–79 (2004). 
 
160
 See Tansey, supra note 159. Another study of Vermont’s Opportunity Credit Union showed that 
borrowers with little or no credit history were 30% less likely to receive auto loans from traditional banks as 
similarly situated individuals with some credit history. Jessica Holmes et al., Does Relationship Lending Still 
Matter in the Consumer Banking Sector? Evidence from the Automobile Loan Market, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 585, 
595 (2007). However, when seeking an auto loan from a CDCU, such borrowers suffered no significant 
disadvantage. Id. This, in large part, is due to the CDCU’s reliance on relationship lending. Id. This is 
significant because, as the authors explained, several studies show that relationship lending “can lower the cost 
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shorter terms, thus tailored specifically to meet the needs of the individuals the 
credit union served.161 The CDCU demonstrate that it is possible for credit 
unions to fulfill the mission that they were initially equipped to serve. 
B. Savings and Loans 
The S&L framework was built for the public purpose of increasing home 
ownership and savings among the poor.162 President Hoover believed that 
home ownership was intrinsically good for individuals and for society and 
pushed for the creation of a banking institution that could help the poor 
overcome the barriers to home ownership.163 Originating in the United States 
prior to the Civil War, building and loan associations were set up “to help 
independent workingmen get suitable homes.”164 The S&L framework 
combined the building and loan associations and savings banks, which were 
created in the nineteenth century to facilitate saving by the poor.165 The S&Ls 
were labeled the “Workingman’s Way to Wealth” and lauded the “virtues of 
cooperation and emancipation from landlords.”166 
 
of financial capital and lessen credit rationing in the markets for small business loans and consumer loans.” Id. 
at 585 (citations omitted). 
 
161
 Marva E. Williams, The Un-Banks: The Community Development Role of Alternative Depository 
Institutions, in FINANCING LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES: MODELS, OBSTACLES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 159, 
173 (Julia Sass Rubin ed., 2007) (summarizing other studies with similar findings). 
 
162
 See HOFFMANN, supra note 73, at 141. 
 
163
 See DAVID L. MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 1831–1995, at 78 (2004); see also Richard F. Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, 
Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1046 n.50 (1963); Kenneth A. Stahl, The 
Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1253 (2008). President Hoover’s sentiment was not unique at the time. The California 
Supreme Court reasoned that: 
With ownership comes stability, the welding together of family ties, and better attention to the 
rearing of children. With ownership comes increased interest in the promotion of public agencies, 
such as church and school, which have for their purpose a desired development of the moral and 
mental make-up of the citizenry of the country. With ownership of one’s home comes recognition 
of the individual’s responsibility for his share in the safe-guarding of the welfare of the 
community and increased pride in personal achievement which must come from personal 
participation in projects looking toward community betterment. 
Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works of L.A., 234 P. 381, 387 (Cal. 1925) (in bank). 
 
164
 Lloyd Rodwin, Studies in Middle Income Housing, 30 SOC. FORCES 292, 293 (1952) (emphasis 
omitted); see also MASON, supra note 163, at 12. 
 
165
 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12 (4th ed. 
2009). 
 
166
 Rodwin, supra note 164, at 293. 
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1. Born of Necessity 
The need for these alternative sources of credit arose as a result of the 
collapse of the banking system in the South following the Civil War and the 
lack of banking services in the still-undeveloped West.167 Most functioning 
banks available were in the Northeast and Midwest.168 This lack of credit 
forced farmers in the South to turn to tenant farming, “borrowing from their 
landlord against their next year’s crop at exorbitant prices, . . . . [while in] the 
West, they often managed without credit by living as subsistence farmers.”169 
Communities in these credit-starved areas addressed the lack of credit by 
creating institutions in which they pooled their money, from which those in 
need could receive loans to buy land, while those who had money could 
receive some return on their savings.170 
2. An Innovative Response 
Much like credit unions, S&Ls were created as mutual savings banks.171 
The model of the industry was neighbors helping neighbors.172 The first S&Ls 
were mutually owned.173 They were created not to make profits, but to achieve 
the public purpose of building homes for their members.174 These were 
distinctively not market entities—they were self-help institutions for the poor 
made possible by government subsidies and regulation.175 Members also 
participated heavily in governance, much like in credit unions. S&L members 
elected the institution’s officers, who frequently were community leaders.176 
 
 
167
 Edward L. Rubin, Communing with Disaster: What We Can Learn from the Jusen and the Savings and 
Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 79, 80–81 (1997). 
 
168
 Id. at 80. 
 
169
 Id. at 80–81. 
 
170
 Id. at 81. 
 
171
 Nicole Fradette et al., Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of the Impact of Reregulation and 
Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 645 (1995); Rubin, supra note 167, 
at 81. 
 
172
 See LAWRENCE V. CONWAY, AM. SAV. & LOAN INST., SAVINGS AND LOAN PRINCIPLES 254 (3d ed. 
1965) (“[S]avings associations . . . try to be, and want you to think of us as, your friend and neighbor.”). 
Multiple S&Ls also use the phrase as a motto for their business or to describe the history of their 
establishment. See, e.g., About Us—The Story, ABBEVILLE SAVINGS & LOAN, http://www.abbevillesavings. 
com/about.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013); DALHART FED. SAVINGS & LOAN ASS’N, http://www.dalhartfederal. 
com/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 
173
 HOFFMANN, supra note 73, at 155; MASON, supra note 163, at 17–18. 
 
174
 See MASON, supra note 163, at 18; William F. McKenna, Control and Management of Federal 
Savings and Loan Associations, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 49 (1953). 
 
175
 MASON, supra note 163, at 12. 
 
176
 Id. at 21. 
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This pooling and lending of resources enabled home ownership for low-
income people who were not given access to customary bank loans.177 Soon, 
S&Ls were able to get bank loans to assist them in making larger loans to their 
members.178 
Savings and loans created innovative products to meet their members’ 
unique needs. The S&L was initially responsible for creating loans that were 
accessible to average Americans. Their loans featured long-term amortization 
and high loan-to-value ratios (65%–75%).179 These loans are familiar today, 
but it was the S&L that first created them.180 Before the S&L, banks only 
provided home financing for 40%–60% loan-to-value ratios,181 with a term of 
one, three, or five years.182 Many people needed to get a second mortgage—
through an unregulated lender at usurious rates—in order to finance their 
home.183 Mainstream home financing was not within reach of most Americans, 
and there were no loans on older homes or low-value homes. S&Ls achieved 
great success184 in providing low- and moderate-income Americans access to 
home ownership.185 And they met this need by creating a product tailored to 
the needs of the poor. 
3. Embraced by the Law 
Savings and loans gained popularity because they met a growing need and 
desire of Americans. In 1930, there were over 12,000 S&Ls with more than 
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twelve million members and assets of more than $8 billion.186 During the 
Depression, S&Ls were susceptible to runs and in danger of being shut down. 
Banks called in the loans to S&Ls while their customers demanded their 
deposits.187 Despite their struggles, many S&Ls survived the Depression intact 
because they did not hold demand deposits and were not obligated to pay their 
depositors right away.188 In 1932, Congress, with President Hoover’s backing, 
passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBA)189 with the long-term goal 
of strengthening the S&Ls to provide home mortgages and increase home 
ownership.190 
After defeating President Hoover, President Roosevelt continued this vision 
for the S&L and enacted several pieces of legislation intended to help 
homeowners. The Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 provided a federal charter 
to S&Ls and imposed federal control over them.191 Savings and loan members 
initially resisted because they wanted to preserve the “local” nature of the S&L 
and asked that their mission be written into the charter: S&Ls were to loan to 
customers within fifty miles of their office to build homes valued at $20,000 or 
less.192 
Several times throughout the history of the S&L, the movement fizzled or 
risked being co-opted by business interests, but was saved by state and federal 
legislation aimed at preserving its purpose.193 For example, when the FDIC 
started insuring banks in 1933,194 deposits flowed out of S&Ls and into 
banks.195 In 1934, S&Ls were given deposit insurance through the Federal 
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Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.196 This made their continued 
existence viable by bringing them on par with mainstream banks.197 
In addition to having their own insurance fund, S&Ls also had their own 
regulators because they functioned differently from traditional banks.198 “The 
mechanisms of the S&L framework were deliberately and elegantly engineered 
to channel social resources into home ownership, and they served their purpose 
effectively for forty-five years.”199 S&Ls drew in the modest deposits of their 
members and channeled those into home mortgages for low-income 
families.200 
4. The S&L Drifts from Its Mission 
The S&L charters, which had grown increasingly popular over several 
decades, were slowly standardized and became an industry rather than a 
movement.201 Nevertheless, S&Ls continued for decades to fulfill their 
progressive mission to provide housing for low-income Americans and 
continued to be mutually owned until the 1970s. However, the S&L industry 
failed disastrously in the late 1970s and 1980s for a variety of reasons, one of 
which is that it lost sight of its initial progressive purpose.202 While there are a 
lot of hypotheses offered to explain the colossal failure of the S&L industry, it 
is undisputed that the industry changed its focus from serving low-income 
individuals to seeking higher profits by mimicking traditional banks.203 
By the 1970s, mutual funds and money market accounts (MMAs) had 
become popular and were drawing deposits away from banks and S&Ls, who 
were capped in how much interest they could pay for deposits.204 Savings and 
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loans joined banks in arguing for the repeal of Regulation Q,205 the cap on 
interest rates.206 The cap on interest rates was ultimately repealed.207 But the 
repeal of the interest rate cap posed a problem for S&Ls, whose assets were 
primarily composed of long-term home loans that continued to pay interest at 
low rates.208 The sudden jump in rates S&Ls had to pay to attract deposits 
without a corresponding jump in rates being paid by their existing long-term 
borrowers meant that much more money was flowing out than in.209 S&Ls 
were caught in an interest rate squeeze.210 Instead of supporting the mission of 
the S&L, policy makers responded by deregulating S&Ls and allowing them to 
engage in shorter term profit-making activities to bridge the profit and loss 
mismatch created by the sudden rise in market interest for deposits.211 
Deregulation of S&Ls coupled with advances in banking that allowed 
money to move quickly between financial institutions caused S&Ls to abandon 
their missions. Soon, S&L members and the communities that had supported 
them for decades abandoned these changed entities. They did so for two 
reasons. First, the interest rate on deposits became more important because 
investors could now shop for the highest interest rate regardless of the location 
of the institution.212 The rate of return became more important than “buying 
local” for higher wealth individuals. Second, these changes diminished the 
importance of community and joint ownership. As the industry became more 
national and dispersed, communities and S&L members felt less of an 
obligation or a desire to invest with their local bank because they knew that 
with the S&L’s expanded powers, the funds could now be used internationally 
and would not necessarily be used to build their communities.213 The national 
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marketplace commoditized the lending business. S&L customers became less 
aware of how their S&Ls were operated and became less resistant when S&Ls 
began to drift from their limited charters and engage in more mainstream 
banking activities. 
5. Deregulation 
In the early 1980s, the S&L industry underwent three phases of 
deregulation through the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), regulatory changes by the Bank Board, and 
the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982.214 The DIDMCA repealed Regulation Q and 
broadened S&Ls’ permissive activities.215 Savings and loans could now offer 
credit cards and traditional interest-bearing checking accounts, as well as 
engage in commercial and general consumer lending.216 They could also invest 
up to 20% of their assets in any combination of consumer loans, commercial 
paper, and corporate bonds, while commercial banks were still prohibited from 
investing in any type of securities.217 The DIDMCA also increased Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insurance from $40,000 per 
account to $100,000.218 
In 1983, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board further loosened regulations 
on S&Ls to allow them to invest in options and to buy and sell securities—
both prohibited for commercial banks—and to offer variable-rate mortgages to 
shift some interest rate risk onto their customers.219 Regulators also lifted a 5% 
cap on so-called “brokered deposits,” big bundles of accounts from pension 
funds, unions, or government agencies.220 Now, when an S&L needed an 
infusion of deposits, it could simply offer the highest interest rate for the day 
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and arrange for brokers to deposit virtually as much money as was needed or 
wanted.221 Savings and loans were growing larger and, due to more relaxed 
accounting standards allowed by federal regulators, taking larger risks.222 
In spite of these efforts to save the S&L industry, it continued to mount 
record losses throughout the early 1980s.223 Congress passed the Garn-St 
Germain Act in 1982 as another attempt to prop up the ailing industry.224 
Under Garn-St Germain, Congress increased the proportion of non-home-
related loans S&Ls could make,225 dropped the down payment requirement for 
home loans,226 and allowed S&Ls to be called “savings banks” rather than 
“savings and loans.”227 Through a joint resolution, Congress also placed the 
full faith and credit of the United States behind FSLIC insurance.228 At the 
same time, regulators loosened the regulations on who could own an S&L. 
Previously, an S&L was required to have at least 400 shareholders, with no one 
shareholder owning more than 25% of the stock.229 Now, a single shareholder 
could own an S&L.230 
In addition to these measures, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the 
primary regulator of S&Ls, stopped enforcing many of its existing 
regulations.231 Moreover, the number of regulators overseeing the industry was 
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being reduced just as interest in owning and operating S&Ls was increasing.232 
Since S&L deposits were FSLIC-insured and backed by the full faith and 
credit of the United States, S&L owners could deal fast and loose with deposits 
without having to worry about repercussions from depositors. In reference to 
the S&L industry in the 1980s, Representative Jim Leach said, “What has 
developed . . . is a giveaway system where the potential profit has been 
privatized while the potential loss has been socialized . . . .”233 Thus, the 
industry became an attractive target for many unscrupulous investors and 
organizations. The loosened regulations attracted the interest of anyone who 
wanted access to millions of FSLIC-insured dollars without much fear of close 
scrutiny from regulators, including people with ties to the mafia and other 
organized crime.234 
In 1987, President Reagan signed into law the Competitive Equality 
Banking Act (CEBA),235 which bailed out the S&L industry to the tune of 
$10.8 billion.236 Even then, industry observers knew this was far less than what 
was necessary to save the industry.237 Many S&Ls continued to fail during the 
1980s with a total loss to the federal government of over $87 billion.238 
These deregulatory measures were envisioned to help the ailing S&L 
industry recover its market strength by allowing them to compete more directly 
with commercial banks.239 The neoliberal ideal that dominated the era had little 
regard for the S&L’s unique mission and advocated for less government 
involvement and more freedom for S&Ls.240 This, it was thought, would save 
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the industry. This assumption led S&Ls to look more like commercial banks.241 
Although there is significant debate on the issue, many scholars have claimed 
that it was the deregulation of the industry that caused it to fail.242 
The deregulation of the industry certainly contributed to its collapse, but it 
is also true that the S&L mission could not survive the 1980s atmosphere 
without serious political support and support by the S&L industry itself, 
neither of which existed. It is also the case that by the 1980s, home ownership 
was not the main financial obstacle of the poor because home financing was 
more accessible than at any other time.243 
C. Morris Banks and Industrial Loan Companies 
Morris Banks were a for-profit venture created to provide credit at low cost 
to low-income industrial workers. These banks were created by a financial 
innovation that enabled extending consumer credit without demanding 
collateral from the borrower.244 Morris Banks later became known as industrial 
loan companies (ILCs) or industrial banks (IBs).245 
1. Born of Necessity 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, there was a great need for small-scale 
and short-term credit among the poor and working classes.246 No one was 
meeting the short-term credit needs of the poor for four primary reasons: (1) 
usury laws prevented traditional lenders from extending credit at profitable 
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rates;247 (2) lenders were unable to distinguish between high- and low-risk 
borrowers who could not provide collateral, creating adverse selection 
problems;248 (3) public mores attached a stigma to both the client and the 
lender;249 and (4) bankers were of the opinion that consumer loans were not a 
market for banking.250 
In 1910, Arthur Morris, a Virginia lawyer who first coined the phrase 
“democratization of credit,” felt a personal motivation to meet the credit needs 
of the poor. He had observed that low- to moderate-level income earners 
lacking the necessary collateral but with a consistent history of income were 
unable to obtain loans through conventional commercial banks and were 
instead forced to turn to pawnbrokers or loan sharks for their credit needs.251 
Morris desired to correct this “weak spot” in the banking system and combed 
the existing laws in search of a solution “that would correct the existing evils 
and supply credit to the needy.”252 
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2. An Innovative Solution 
Arthur Morris was motivated to meet this need and was innovative in his 
approach. Morris, who was convinced that “80 percent of the American public 
was being denied adequate banking services,”253 designed a system whereby 
loans to the poor were made based on three principles: (1) “[c]haracter, plus 
earning power, is a proper basis of credit”; (2) “[l]oans made on this basis of 
credit must carry the privilege of repayment over a period long enough to 
match the [borrower’s earning power]”; and (3) “[m]oney so borrowed should 
always be for some constructive and useful purpose.”254 From these principles, 
Morris developed a system that replaced collateral with the signatures of two 
cosigners, both of whom agreed to pay the loan should the borrower default.255 
This innovation in lending is still used today. 
By requiring cosigners to the loan, the “Morris Plan” resolved the adverse 
selection problem that had historically vexed lenders.256 However, by itself, the 
cosigner innovation would not have been sufficient for proper entrance into the 
personal loan market. The legal hurdle of usury laws also needed to be 
overcome; otherwise, the lender could not make any profit.257 Morris also 
solved this problem through a “dual plan,” involving two separate 
transactions.258 The plan resulted in a system that could stay within the letter of 
the usury law but still recoup the full cost of making relatively small, 
unsecured personal loans to unfamiliar borrowers.259 With his revolutionary 
new method of extending credit, Morris began establishing “Morris Plan” 
institutions in various cities around the United States,260 and by 1928 there 
were 106 such institutions.261 
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3. Embraced by the Law 
While their expansion was swift, Morris Plan Banks encountered some 
difficulty in obtaining charters because of confusion about their exact nature. 
In response to Morris’s original application for incorporation of his charter 
bank in Virginia, a member of the Virginia Corporation Commission 
responded by letter: 
I have carefully considered your application for a charter for your 
hybrid and mongrel institution. Frankly, I don’t know what it is. It 
isn’t a savings bank; it isn’t a state or national bank; it isn’t a charity. 
It isn’t anything I ever heard of before. Its principles seem sound 
however, and its purpose admirable. But the real reason that I am 
going to grant a charter is because I believe in you.262 
The first Morris Plan Bank—the Fidelity Savings & Trust Company—was 
opened in Norfolk in 1910 with a state charter.263 
Arthur Morris set out on a vigorous campaign to encourage enactment of 
laws that would enable the Morris Banks to fulfill their mission of lending to 
low-income workers.264 By 1930, Morris Plan Banks were operating in thirty-
one states.265 In some states, specially tailored legislation was enacted to 
support Morris Banks; in other states, Morris Banks operated under the state 
banking or even general corporation laws.266 Thus, although united in name, 
the industry was divided in operations and, increasingly, in customer 
markets.267 It was along these fault lines that the industry split into those that 
would continue to fulfill Arthur Morris’s vision of extending credit to the 
working class and those that pursued other clients for their business.268 
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4. Competition from Other Banks and Loss of Mission 
The principal reasons for Morris Banks converting to commercial banks 
were an increasingly competitive market,269 changes in the legal and regulatory 
environment that incentivized or required the switch,270 and tax advantages 
available to owners of commercial banks that were not available to industrial 
bank owners.271 The primary driver of the Morris Banks’ downfall as 
originally conceived was the competition for consumer loans. Because these 
banks were not mutually owned like credit unions and S&Ls, but instead made 
profits for their owners, their products were quickly copied by mainstream 
banks that also wanted to capitalize on these loans.272 Expansion by 
commercial banks into consumer credit affected industrial banks most acutely 
“[s]ince commercial banks competed directly for Morris Plan clients, and 
could draw on much cheaper money.”273 
Commercial banks moved into consumer credit for a variety of reasons: 
lack of commercial loans during the Great Depression,274 a high demand for 
consumer credit,275 bankers’ increased familiarity with and belief in the 
soundness of installment loans,276 and a change in the classification of 
intermediate- and long-term loans.277 With commercial banks entering into the 
personal loan market, Morris Banks found themselves needing to compete for 
their customers’ dollars intensely and vigorously.278 Their strategy was 
twofold: expanding the types of loans they made and adopting commercial 
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loan practices.279 By operating more like a commercial bank, Morris Banks 
found they could effectively compete.280 It was not much of a stretch for these 
institutions to go from operating like a commercial bank to converting into 
one, which is what happened with more and more regularity as the ILC grew 
further distant from its founding mission. 
Although Morris Banks were attempting to democratize credit for low-
income workers, they were a for-profit business from their creation.281 
However, the high costs associated with making small individual loans to those 
in desperate straits282 made it difficult for these banks to retain their original 
mission after the founder, Arthur Morris, was no longer championing the 
cause.
283
 A statement by H. B. Jackson, secretary of the Morris Plan Company 
of New York, illustrates this shift: “While the remedial loan was the entering 
wedge of the Morris Plan and must always remain an important part of our 
work, it is to the constructive loan that we look with the greatest expectation of 
results.”284 While it may have been the wish of Arthur Morris to make the low-
income wage earner the perpetual focus of Morris Bank loans, the movement 
away from this original mission was accelerated by the simple fact that, even 
from the very beginning, Morris Plan institutions were locally owned and 
operated and would respond to the demands of those local owners.285 This 
rapid shift demonstrates that profit-seeking ownership will always search out 
the most efficient use of capital for the desired appetite for risk. Morris Banks 
quickly abandoned their mission, and the legal and regulatory environment 
increasingly made commercial banks the attractive model for the ill-defined 
industrial bank.286 
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5. Deregulation 
In the 1980s, commercial firms became interested in acquiring “nonbank 
banks,” or banks that were exempt from the Bank Holding Company Act 
(BHCA).287 Owning such a bank would allow commercial firms to enter 
banking without having to comply with the onerous regulations of the 
BHCA.288 The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 closed the “nonbank 
bank[]” loophole,289 but specifically exempted ILCs because of a few well-
placed senators whose states had a vested interest in chartering ILCs.290 The 
ILC loophole became one of the only and most attractive options for a 
commercial firm to own a bank.291 Quickly after CEBA’s passage, large 
commercial firms, such as General Electric, General Motors, and American 
Express, started operating ILCs that they used to finance their own products.292 
The ILC sector grew exponentially.293 Today, there are no ILCs that operate 
like their early predecessors. Their early mission is just a curious historical 
note. 
D. Common Features of Banks That Served the Poor 
As Part II has shown, credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks have several 
common features. First, these banks were born out of necessity. All three of 
these banks were used to meet the needs of the poor that were not being met by 
the banking institutions of the day. They were created outside of mainstream 
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banking and with a different vision than most banks. Second, they were all 
innovative in addressing the needs of the poor. The S&L helped create the 
modern mortgage, the Morris Bank created the non-collateralized loan, and the 
credit union created formalized lending cooperatives. The S&L and credit 
union were both community-owned and controlled and emphasized personal 
relationships with the borrower as a proxy for high interest. Third, each was 
supported by the government and regulated differently than mainstream banks. 
This governmental support was essential in the expansion of each of these 
banks and allowed them to thrive despite obstacles in servicing their clients. 
Fourth, all of these banks changed course dramatically in the 1980s and have 
abandoned their primary mission of providing credit to the poor. Fifth, 
deregulation played a key role in each bank’s change of focus. 
The following Part describes some of the general changes in banking and 
society that explain why low-income individuals have struggled with access to 
banks. These include changes in banking philosophy, including deregulation, 
as well as changes in the demographics of the poor and the changing nature of 
their needs. Drawing on successful features of the credit union, S&L, and 
Morris Bank, this Article then describes a few programs launched by the 
government, the poor, and non-profit organizations that may provide solutions 
to the problem of banking the poor. 
III.  WELCOME TO POTTERSVILLE 
In Frank Capra’s classic film It’s a Wonderful Life, Mr. Potter, a heartless 
banker, tries to persuade George Bailey’s building and loan association to stop 
providing home loans to the working poor. But George Bailey believes in the 
community building mission of his bank and starts up Bailey Park, an 
affordable housing project with the funds from his building and loan 
association. In contrast, Henry Potter envisions maximizing profits for his bank 
by driving out the poor and getting the most out of his bank’s assets. In the 
movie, George Bailey triumphs with the help of an angel and a whole town’s 
support. But in American banking history, Henry Potter’s vision is the one that 
has more or less come to pass. The contrast between Bailey’s and Potter’s 
banks illustrates the difference between running a building and loan 
association that makes a profit, but has as its main objective servicing the 
working poor, and running a bank whose only aim is to maximize profits for its 
shareholders. Most mainstream banks today operate like Potter’s bank. 
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This Part attempts to explain the sudden and dramatic shift in banking for 
the poor that occurred in the 1980s. Several specific factors caused the credit 
union, S&L, and Morris Bank to shift their focus away from the poor and 
toward mainstream banking customers, many of which have been outlined 
above. However, there are broader shifts in banking and in society that also 
explain this change, which is the focus of the following Part. Below, this Part 
discusses three generalized explanations of how the poor were cut out of 
banking: (1) market forces—such as changes in banking products, 
disintermediation, and financial innovation in the 1980s—that put pressure on 
the traditional banking model; (2) deregulation in banking; and (3) social and 
cultural explanations for the banking sector’s abandonment of the poor. 
A. Market Forces 
During the 1980s, mainstream banks that used to dominate the financial 
market started to lose market share to the capital markets and unregulated 
financial entities, such as investment banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds.294 
Banks were no longer the only option for investors. The sophistication of the 
capital markets and new financial products allowed institutional and individual 
investors to access the markets without needing intermediaries. 
Disintermediation caused a streamlining in the movement of credit to the 
benefit of many businesses. At the same time, financial innovation provided 
customers a variety of investment options, and they quickly became 
comfortable depositing their money in money market accounts or mutual funds 
and removing it from their non-interest-bearing deposit accounts.295 
Banks started to find ways around regulations in order to participate in the 
financial bounty of the 1980s. During this time, most banks left the “storage 
business”—originating and holding loans—and moved to the “moving 
business”—taking loans from originators, repackaging them, and moving them 
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to secondary market investors like pension funds.296 Where banks used to 
make money on the spread—the difference between what they received from 
borrowers and the interest paid to depositors—banks now focused on fees for 
transactions.297 The easy profits from transactions distracted many banks from 
their core functions, and banks stopped lending to small- and medium-sized 
businesses in pursuit of ever-higher fees.298 Banks, which had operated a 
boring and safe business plan for many decades, became exciting, innovative, 
and much more profitable. 
With the introduction of the money market account in the 1980s that paid 
high interest and allowed customers liquidity (the ability to write checks on the 
account), banks were forced to compete for large deposits and cut costs, 
including services previously offered to low-income customers.299 Both the 
S&L and the credit union were casualties of the increased competitive 
environment. Both of these banks joined the competition for deposits and were 
forced to shed unprofitable accounts in order to stay above water.300 
The number of people with bank accounts declined starting in the 1980s, 
especially within the low-income sector,301 due to “an increase in fees on 
deposit accounts with small balances.”302 The GAO published an extensive 
report303 on these changes and prompted an additional study by the Federal 
Reserve that supported the finding that banks were indeed shedding low-
income customers due to higher fees on checking accounts.304 Banks also 
began closing branches in low-income areas, leaving many low-income 
neighborhoods with no physical access to any banking institution.305 These 
branch closings especially impacted African-Americans and Hispanics living 
in urban areas.306 Once the banks left low-income communities, fringe banks 
moved in with staggering numbers.307 
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During this time, banking also moved from focusing on a local market 
toward taking advantage of economies of scale and seeking a national 
presence. The impact on the poor from this change cannot be understated. In 
the age of conservative and boring banks, banks had a presence in a 
community and their assets and liabilities stayed within the community. This 
was the model of George Bailey’s bank as well as the S&L and credit union. 
Funds would gather in a bank and stay there, which allowed the rich in the 
community to subsidize loans to the poor. As banking and banks became more 
complex in their operations, they also became more global and less local; 
money no longer had to stay in the community in which a depositor resided. If 
those assets could be used more efficiently in another market, they would 
move there—either through bank branching or banking affiliates. The 
advantage to this movement and complexity is the rate at which money could 
grow and make profits by being put to its most efficient use. Unfortunately, 
giving small loans to the poor at low interest is not an efficient way to grow 
money, and thus most banks stopped doing it. 
B. Financial Deregulation 
The rules of banking were changed to match the changed landscape. Banks 
lobbied vigorously for deregulation and for limited government intrusion into 
the banking market.308 The gradual deregulation of banks expanded from the 
Carter to the second Bush Administration.309 The banking sector thought that 
government regulation was stifling market competition and that they could 
operate more profitably and efficiently without it. Proponents of deregulation 
advocated a banking regime that was as close to a free market as possible.310 
There were many changes during this time, but most relevant here was the 
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homogenization of banking.311 As a result of the deregulation, most banks 
resembled each other in their mission and purpose.312 
The pluralism in banking was more or less abandoned and a more 
homogenized sector emerged. What this meant was that banks were all treated 
as market participants and forced to compete against each other for the same 
deposits and customers. The goals of the credit union and S&L were slowly 
lost and replaced by the demands of a competitive banking market. Many 
banks started to vigorously oppose the credit unions’ favorable tax status as 
they started to compete more directly with banks.313 Many believed that the 
banking market could meet the needs of the poor without these specially 
chartered institutions.314 Indeed, some have even claimed that securitization 
was the market’s answer to the home ownership goals of the S&Ls.315 As a 
natural extension, increased securitization during the housing bubble should 
have been the ultimate fulfillment of the American dream rather than a major 
setback. 
After the collapse of the financial markets, few people today would 
advocate for the deregulation that was pushed in the 1980s. Many policy 
makers recognize now that the recent banking collapse was at least partly 
caused by the no-holds-barred deregulation of the 1980s that allowed banks to 
become larger and more active in a variety of markets.316 The Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 
311
 See James J. White, Introduction to the Banking Law Symposium: A 200 Year Journey from Anarchy 
to Oligarchy, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1063 (1989) (arguing that the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) would speed the “ultimate assimilation [of savings and loans] into 
commercial banks”); Daniel E. Feder, Comment, Should Loan-to-Value Ratio Restrictions Be Reimposed on 
National Banks’ Real Estate Lending Activities?, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 341, 344–54 (1987) (positing that a 
main goal of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 was “to deregulate and homogenize the 
deposit-taking financial institutions market”). 
 
312
 See White, supra note 311, at 1063; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial 
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 
476. 
 
313
 Banks and policy makers fought against tax advantages and other special privileges for credit unions 
and S&Ls. See G. Allen Hicks, Comment, Common Sense on the Common Bond: Banks, Federal Credit 
Unions, and Field of Membership Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1201, 1219–20 (1999). 
 
314
 See, e.g., id. at 1207 (noting studies showing that banks made more mortgage loans to low-income 
individuals than credit unions). 
 
315
 See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, A Long Strange Trip: The State and Mortgage Securitization, 
1968–2010, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCE (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
10–11), available at http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/labor/documents/Fligstein_ALongStrangeTrip_ 
UCSB.pdf. 
 
316
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION 45–46 (2009); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 
BARADARAN GALLEYSPROOFS1 3/5/2013 11:22 AM 
2013] HOW THE POOR GOT CUT OUT OF BANKING 531 
of 2010317 is, at least theoretically, a re-stiffening of banking regulation and a 
reasserting of regulatory control over banks.318 However, as policy makers 
have begun to question some of the principles of deregulation, none have 
drawn attention to some of the important victims of deregulation: the banks 
that used to serve the poor. 
C. Social and Cultural Changes 
There are other possible explanations for why banking institutions stopped 
serving the poor that focus not on banks, but on the poor. These potential 
explanations can be summarized as follows: (1) banking institutions were 
victims of their own success—they graduated the poor into the middle class, 
solved the problem they were created to address, or are no longer needed to 
service the poor; and (2) the poor are now poorer than before and do not have 
sufficient funds to be banked. 
1. The Problem Was Solved 
This argument posits that when the S&L and credit union were created, the 
populace was much poorer than it is today. These institutions started in an era 
when there was more rampant poverty and less government support. It is 
indeed the case that American society has softened the blow of poverty since 
the Great Depression due to government safety nets; thus, there is more 
recourse for the destitute today than before. However, poverty remains and is 
increasing.319 In September 2011, the Census Bureau reported that “the number 
of Americans living below the official poverty line, 46.2 million people, was 
the highest number in the 52 years the bureau has been publishing figures on 
it.”320 The report also warned of increased income inequality, wage stagnation, 
and rampant unemployment.321 Poverty has always been, and continues to be, a 
reality for many Americans. 
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a. The Poor Have Access to Credit 
Some claim that credit is abundantly available to the poor and that the 
problem they face is not that they are underserved by the credit industry, but 
overserved.322 This argument relies on the widespread availability of fringe 
banking. However, as mentioned above, the fringe banking industry does not 
provide healthy credit options for the poor—credit that allows them to escape 
poverty. Aiding the poor is not about increasing the quantity of credit 
available. Rather, it is about improving the quality of available credit. The 
reason the credit union, S&L, and Morris Bank were successful in their 
missions is that they offered credit that was low cost and flexible. 
Others claim that the poor need financial education in order to take 
advantage of smart credit, as opposed to high-cost credit.323 They claim that 
those who are poor are poor because they do not have the financial 
understanding of the middle class.324 Financial education is indeed necessary to 
overcome poverty. There are many factors that cause endemic poverty, and 
lack of education is an important contributor. Most low-income individuals 
know the difference between good credit and bad credit, but due to their 
economic status are only offered the latter. Many assume that the poor do not 
understand the financial system, and that they must be taught how it works.325 
This is not necessarily the case. Many of the poor are balancing a variety of 
debts from different lenders, and juggling multiple payments with very few 
assets and resources.326 In many respects, they are better versed in the financial 
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system than many in the middle class because they are in daily contact with 
money, debt, and credit.327 Thus, it is not financial literacy that they most need, 
but institutional access that meets their specific needs. 
2. Too Poor to Bank 
The argument that the poor are too poor for bank accounts has some 
support in the historical data. John Caskey believed that lower income is the 
main cause for the decrease in bank accounts.328 In other words, apart from the 
changes in banking, people just do not have enough money to save anything at 
all. The poor are simply poorer now than they were in the past. Caskey 
identified several social changes that led to lower income for the poor, 
including the loss of low-skilled jobs, increased immigration, and an increase 
in single-parent homes.329 According to Caskey, lower income is one factor 
that led to the poor gradually moving away from mainstream banks and toward 
fringe lenders.330 This does not mean, however, that the poor do not need 
banks. They may not benefit from savings accounts, but as demonstrated 
above, they do need short-term credit. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS FOR BANKING TO THE POOR 
A. Enlisting Mainstream Banks 
Since the era of deregulation, government efforts to provide banking 
services to the poor have centered on mainstream banks. Policy makers have 
tried both carrot and stick measures in an attempt to get these banks to lend to 
the poor. Most of these initiatives have been unsuccessful. 
1. FDIC Pilot Program 
The most recent attempt by policy makers to induce mainstream banks to 
lend to the poor was launched in February 2008. The FDIC began the “Small-
Dollar Loan Pilot Program,” a two-year campaign to enlist mainstream banks 
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to loan to the poor.331 The project was described as “a case study designed to 
illustrate how banks can profitably offer affordable small-dollar loans as an 
alternative to high-cost credit products, such as payday loans and fee-based 
overdraft protection.”332 The program enlisted twenty-eight volunteer banks to 
offer banking services that the poor needed, such as payday loans and check 
cashing.333 
The Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Credit of the House 
Committee on Financial Services met in September 2011 to review the 
program, and many were in agreement that the program had failed.334 
Observers noted that banks were charging the maximum rates allowed in the 
program—36% APR and 20% charges on cashed checks.335 Some noted that 
these products were just like payday loans.336 Other congressmen resisted 
forcing mainstream banks to take on the risk of lending to the poor.337 
Although the program resulted in some unbanked individuals forging new 
relationships with banks, the banks offered products that were not much more 
desirable than those offered by fringe banks, and the banks did not design new 
procedures or products that might be more attractive to the poor. 
The main reason this program failed is that mainstream banks did not have 
the incentive to sacrifice profits in order to meet the needs of the poor. They 
must survive and stay profitable in a competitive banking market, and when 
they offer low-cost loans to the poor, they lose their competitive position and 
hurt their bottom line. The reason that the credit union, S&L, and Morris Bank 
were able to successfully reach the poor was because they were motivated to 
do so. In fact, that was their primary goal. Policy makers misunderstand the 
nature of mainstream banks if they are relying on them to adequately meet the 
needs of the poor. At best, they can be incentivized to do it in order to appease 
regulators. The products they offer are not innovative creations resulting from 
market research about what the poor really need—they offer the bare minimum 
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so that they can maintain profitability while fulfilling a regulatory mandate.338 
Forcing banks, whose purpose is to make maximum profits, to make loans to 
the poor will inevitably lead to inadequate loans and disgruntled bankers. 
2. Community Reinvestment Act 
Government efforts such as the Community Reinvestment Act attempt to 
remedy discriminatory behavior such as redlining, but they also encourage 
banks to lend in low-income communities.339 The CRA views the lending 
market through an affirmative-action framework and imposes duties on banks 
to lend to underserved communities.340 The CRA represents government 
imposition of social norms on the banking market and forces commercial 
banks to serve markets that they have deemed unprofitable.341 As such, it has 
been controversial. Professors Macey and Miller have criticized the CRA by 
stating that it “promotes the concentration of assets in geographically 
nondiversified locations, encourages banks to make unprofitable and risky 
investment and product-line decisions, and penalizes banks that seek to reduce 
costs by consolidating services or closing or relocating branches.”342 
Proponents of the CRA counter these claims by showing that the Act has 
indeed increased lending to low-income communities and led to more branch 
openings in these underserved areas.343 But most commentators agree that the 
enforcement of the CRA has been weak and has not brought about the desired 
results.344 
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There is a robust debate about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
CRA345 that this Article will not engage, except to posit that regardless of its 
effects on low-income communities, the CRA relies on profit-maximizing 
banks to meet the needs of the poor. As one scholar has reasoned: “In an 
industry of banks of many types and sizes, without credit quotas and with 
institutional decisionmaking left to bank managers, the best the CRA can do is 
to prescribe inexact guidelines and then to ask that bureaucrats apply these 
guidelines to various real-world situations on a case-by-case basis.”346 
Unfortunately, when such a mismatch of incentives exists, it will lead banks to 
pay more attention to their interests than the interests of the targeted customers, 
the poor, often resulting in damaging consequences.347 
And because the underlying goal of mainstream banks is to maximize 
profits, the CRA is ripe for manipulation. During the financial crisis, there 
were reports that “at least in some instances, the CRA . . . served as a catalyst, 
inducing banks to enter underserved markets that they might otherwise have 
ignored,” which resulted in unfavorable loans to people in those underserved 
communities.348 “[R]ecent problems in mortgage markets illustrate that an 
underlying assumption of the CRA—that more lending equals better outcomes 
for local communities[—]may not always hold.”349 The CRA’s emphasis on 
the number of loans given, as opposed to the quality of the loans, has revealed 
itself to be a problematic measure of success. 
The debate over the CRA implicates two broader questions about providing 
banking for the poor: (1) whether mainstream commercial banks should be 
tasked with providing these services, and (2) whether they can do it in a way 
that is beneficial to the poor. In other words, if a bank that attempts to 
maximize profits is forced by regulators to offer services to the poor, will this 
lead to harmful products or manipulation of regulatory loopholes? Indeed, 
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these banks are not equipped to meet the needs of the poor and their incentives 
to maximize profits run counter to the needs of the poor. 
B. Community Development Banking Act 
Through the Community Development Banking Act (CDBA), the idea of 
community-centered banks—banks that would receive funding from the 
government or other sources and would specialize in providing financial 
services to poor communities—had a short-lived resurgence. But the model has 
not yet succeeded because it has not escaped the mainstream ideology of 
banking and been fully supported by the government. 
South Shore Bank in Chicago started as an experiment in which community 
activists bought a struggling bank and began lending in an impoverished area 
with apparent success in transforming the area.350 Bill Clinton, after visiting 
the bank in 1985, wanted to make it a model for low-income communities and 
subsequently made a campaign promise that he would establish one hundred 
such banks across the country.351 The campaign promise was transformed into 
legislative action in 1994. The Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, commonly known as the Community 
Development Banking Act,352 was intended “to promote economic 
revitalization and community development through investment in and 
assistance to community development financial institutions.”353 The Act 
provided for a fund that would support any Community Development 
Financial Institution (CDFI), which it defined as an institution that (1) has “a 
primary mission of promoting community development”; (2) “serves an 
investment area or targeted population”; and (3) “provides development 
services in conjunction with equity investments or loans.”354 
Congress, however, never appropriated the full amount authorized by the 
CDBA for the CDFI Fund, which would have enabled government investments 
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in community banks.355 The Bush Administration also sharply reduced funds to 
the CDFIs.356 These funds have never been robust or popular. In fact, the press 
and the banking community have largely ignored these banks because they are 
still relatively small in number and a large portion of the funds are dispersed 
among various community development initiatives.357 According to the Fund’s 
financial disclosures, the majority of investments have gone, first, to real estate 
development in low-income communities and, second, to businesses operating 
in those areas.358 In other words, the majority of the funds have not been used 
to provide what the majority of the poor need, such as short-term credit. 
From the start, the framework of the CDBA was stuck in the modern 
banking model and based on the faulty premise that these banks could maintain 
high levels of profitability while serving the poor. The needs of the poor would 
be met without any adjustment to free market rules and with minimal 
government intervention. It was thought that these institutions would lend 
profitably to low-income communities, achieve significant returns on 
investments, and thereby induce mainstream financial institutions to join them 
in providing credit to the poor.359 Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence 
Summers envisioned “[a] successful CDFI [as] perhaps best compared to a 
niche venture capital firm that deploys its superior knowledge of an emerging 
market niche to invest and manage risk better than other investors.”360 
Summers envisioned these banks as “market scouts” that would seek out 
profits in overlooked markets.361 CDFIs were meant to be private institutions 
seeking profits while serving the poor. Donald Lash, an early CDBA advocate, 
 
 
355
 Lash, supra note 77, at 397 tbl.1, 398. The Fund was also brought within the purview of the Treasury 
Department in 1996 and has been mentioned as one of the accomplishments of the Clinton Administration. Id. 
at 398. 
 
356
 See Sarah Molseed, Note, An Ownership Society for All: Community Development Financial 
Institutions as the Bridge Between Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 489, 509 (2006); Katie Kuehner-Hebert, CDFI Fund Appropriation Could Increase to $100M, AM. 
BANKER (N.Y.), June 13, 2007, at 4 (indicating that the Bush Administration sharply reduced funding from its 
peak in 2001, however, it requested an increase for fiscal year 2008); David Morrison, Bush Administration 
Lowballs CDFI Fund Once Again, CREDIT UNION TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, at 2 (stating that the proposed budget 
under the Bush Administration was an almost 70% cut to the CDFI Fund). 
 
357
 See Benjamin et al., supra note 159, at 179 (explaining that the existing analysis is limited because the 
existing groups are so diverse and hard to classify). 
 
358
 Id. at 178–88. 
 
359
 Lash, supra note 77, at 399. 
 
360
 Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Building Emerging Markets in America’s Inner Cities, 
Remarks to the National Council for Urban Economic Development (Mar. 2, 1998), available at http://www. 
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2262.aspx. 
 
361
 Id. 
BARADARAN GALLEYSPROOFS1 3/5/2013 11:22 AM 
2013] HOW THE POOR GOT CUT OUT OF BANKING 539 
claimed that competition in banking would open the way for CDFIs to expand 
in response to market needs.362 
Many in the banking community lauded South Shore Bank as a model of 
profitability as well as community-mindedness.363 Here was a bank that could 
serve the poor and make profits for its investors. The vision of the CDFI Fund 
was that without structural changes to the banking framework, profit-
maximizing institutions could be induced through modest funds and incentives 
to meet the needs of struggling communities. But this was not the vision of 
South Shore Bank, which was started by civil rights activists in Chicago with 
the aim of serving the direct needs of the community and an ambitious slogan, 
“Let’s change the world.”364 
Because these banks were forced to work in the dominant banking model, 
many have recently failed or are in trouble.365 In 2010, South Shore Bank was 
taken over after being declared insolvent.366 Even before the financial crisis 
wrought havoc on small banking nationwide, these institutions were struggling 
to remain profitable. Compared with their more conventional peers, CDFIs 
routinely show weaker financial performance. “An analysis of regulated CDFI 
Fund awardees found that these CDFIs typically had fewer total assets, higher 
loan delinquency and charge-off rates, and lower returns on assets than their 
non-CDFI contemporaries.”367 The way CDFIs operate is simply more costly 
than the way their traditional counterparts operate, and their objectives would 
be thwarted if they attempted to offset their risks with excessively high interest 
rates. 
Part of the problem with the CDBA was that the legislation was not 
aspirational enough in its scope and mission. Although modeled after the bold 
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vision of South Shore Bank, the CDBA was not intended to change the 
business of banking to meet the needs of the poor, but to fit the needs of the 
poor into the business of banking. Unlike the progressive and populist 
movements that brought about the credit union and the S&L, the CDBA 
movement is dependent on the current banking structure and does not attempt 
to subvert the institutional profit-seeking model. By offering financial 
incentives to mainstream banks to reach out to the poor, the CDBA expects 
these banks to do the heavy lifting without changing the competitive 
environment of banking or offering significant subsidies. Thus, the CDBA is 
the proverbial carrot as the CRA was the stick—both attempting to coax 
mainstream banks to do something inherently inconsistent with their business 
models.  
Despite the failure of the model to expand nationwide and survive financial 
distress, the CDBA should be refined, not abandoned. Primarily, the CDBA 
model needs to escape the profit-centered ideology of modern banking to allow 
these institutions to function. If these banks are to continue to offer needed 
services to the poor, they must be able to function with minimal profits and 
maximum government support. Lending to the poor is not a profitable 
business, and the government must not outsource this important social need to 
the mainstream banking model. Congress must adequately subsidize this 
lending if it is to be effective. 
C. Movements Led by the Poor 
1. Informal Lending Circles 
As noted above, mainstream banks and the modern banking model fail to 
provide appropriate services to the poor because they lack the motivation to do 
so. Effective banking to the poor may require that the communities themselves 
be involved, just as they were in the formation of the credit union and S&L. 
The poor know what they lack and what they need, and they should be 
empowered to organize movements that meet their credit needs. However, to 
be successful, they must have government support and access to the formal 
banking infrastructure. 
An example of self-help financing is the lending circle model prevalent 
both in the United States and abroad. In the United States, undocumented 
workers and many immigrant groups have organized informal lending circles 
whereby individuals pool resources and pick a member of the group by lot to 
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receive a loan.368 These informal lending circles resemble the early credit 
unions and have roughly the same goal of providing credit to their members 
outside formal markets.369 These groups can overcome the informational 
asymmetries and transaction costs that are often the most important barriers for 
mainstream institutions lending credit to immigrant and poor communities.370 
These informal lending circles resemble the microcredit model of the 
Grameen Bank and other international nonprofits. Multiple attempts at 
establishing formal microcredit ventures in the United States have been 
organized on the principles underlying the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,371 
but many have suffered from setbacks and hurdles, such as lack of informal 
markets as well as geographical and social impediments.372 Furthermore, the 
microcredit model is useful for small businesses and entrepreneurial ventures 
but is not a model that can meet the short-term credit needs of the poor.373 
The communities that develop informal lending circles are usually tightly 
knit and share a cultural bond or language.374 These groups are formed on 
mutual trust, which is “faithful to the Latin from which ‘credit’ derives: 
credere—‘to believe.’”375 And belief is something mainstream lenders lack 
when it comes to assessing the creditworthiness of immigrants, minorities, and 
the poor. Thus, credit circles are designed to overcome market inefficiencies 
and allow capital formation and growth among tightly knit communities.376 
Studies in New York’s Chinatown and California’s Japanese communities 
reveal that these institutions are the dominant form of banking among these 
groups. A staggering 80% of Koreans in the United States belong to at least 
one informal credit group.377 These groups optimize community wealth, do not 
rely on government enforcement or intrusion, and are entirely self-funded.378 
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These groups are seen as alternative markets formed to deal with market 
imperfections, an arrangement that bolsters the dominant free market model. 
They operate outside the mainstream banking model as a “borrower’s solution 
to market imperfections, a consumer-driven arrangement that is a solution to 
an inherent market deficiency soluble neither by state regulation nor by open 
market arrangements.”379 These groups are an essential feature of the informal 
credit market and preferable to for-profit fringe banking that is currently filling 
gaps in the mainstream banking sector at high costs. But these alternative 
markets do not interact with or inform the mainstream markets. 
Despite the attractiveness and desirability of such a solution to the 
problems facing the poor, informal lending circles are not an adequate remedy 
for several reasons. First, these groups do not have any formal relationship 
with traditional banks, which is problematic because their members are not 
able to develop a credit history and enter mainstream banking. Additionally, 
their deposits are not protected and their investments are vulnerable to fraud or 
mismanagement by others. Second, while these groups may be an answer for 
tightly knit groups of immigrants with a shared language and culture, they do 
not arise among the large majority of American urban and rural poor who do 
not share common social norms. In addition, these groups only serve those on 
the fringe of the mainstream markets who have community support and not the 
destitute or those completely cut off from any help.380 Third, credit is no less 
costly from these groups than from alternative lending sources. Members can 
pay up to 20% interest on loans, which means these funds are funds of last 
resort or necessary because borrowers lack an alternative.381 Lastly, these 
groups cannot help with emergency or everyday credit needs, which continue 
to be the domain of loan sharks or payday loans. 
2. Formal Lending Circles 
One way to remedy some of the shortcomings outlined above is to 
formalize these lending circles, which was essentially the success of the credit 
union movement. Informal lending circles resemble the early credit unions and 
building and loans, but they lack the governmental support that allowed these 
institutions to thrive and expand. However, these lending circles can forge 
partnerships with banks and give their members the ability to build credit and 
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open bank accounts. One example of such an arrangement was initiated by the 
Mission Asset Fund (MAF) in San Francisco, which has linked a lending 
circle, called a “cesta,” with Citibank.382 MAF serves as a credit servicer that 
bridges the gap between the pooled assets of the lending circle and the formal 
banking system.383 The fund currently serves Spanish-speaking immigrants.384 
All members are required to have a bank account, and the payments are 
automatically withdrawn from the individuals’ accounts and given out 
electronically as well.385 These transactions are reported to the credit bureau, 
helping members build a positive credit history.386 The group claims a zero 
default rate and a successful education initiative for its members.387 The MAF 
model has received a grant from the Center for Financial Services Innovation 
(CFSI) and will attempt to replicate its model among Chinese immigrants, 
African-Americans, Middle-Eastern immigrants, and the LGBT communities 
in San Francisco.388 
A formalized lending circle has the capacity to overcome some of the 
weaknesses in the informal lending model by formalizing these arrangements 
to gain the benefits of FDIC insurance and establishing credit. As mentioned 
above, many of the poor prefer informality in lending, and institutions that can 
feign informality, such as check cashers, have capitalized on this preference. 
The MAF attempts to do the same, but without a motive to make large profits. 
However, this model is limited in reach and scope. It relies on bankers’ 
willingness to forge these partnerships, and only a limited number of 
knowledgeable bankers may be altruistic enough to engage in such an 
enterprise. Moreover, only members can benefit from the fund, and members 
must commit funds to the lending circle to participate. These funds do not 
provide short-term credit, do not replace the services of fringe banks, and do 
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not offer the scope of services the credit unions, S&Ls, and Morris Banks 
offered. 
D. Post Office Banking 
In addition to supporting innovative movements led by the poor 
themselves, policy makers should consider initiating alternative banking forms 
that would provide much-needed services to the large and growing unbanked 
population. Instead of relying on the commercial banking sector to fill the gaps 
in banking, government-sponsored institutions could meet these needs. As 
demonstrated by the credit union and S&L industries, a successful movement 
must be embraced by the government in order to gain trust and legitimacy. One 
option is to reenlist the Postal Service and use an existing, but struggling, 
government resource to meet a pressing policy objective.389 As mentioned 
above, the government has used the Postal Service in the past to enable the 
poor to open savings accounts. Post offices can be used as a way to offer short-
term, low-interest credit to low-income Americans. Just like credit unions and 
S&Ls of the past, the Postal Service could operate through minimal 
government subsidies and still maintain modest profits. 
The post office could offer check cashing and payday lending services 
much like those offered by fringe banks, but at a much lower cost. It could also 
offer them without all the documentation and formal barriers of banks. There 
are currently non-banks, other than fringe lenders, starting to offer these 
products because they do not involve sophisticated credit analysis or any 
regulatory support, such as FDIC deposit insurance. For example, Wal-Mart 
recently started to offer simple credit options, such as check cashing, at a 
discount to its customers in its stores with much acclaim.390 Similarly, the 
Postal Service could function as a basic credit intermediary. Fringe banks do 
not need a banking charter to offer these simple types of credit, so banking 
laws would not apply to such an arrangement.391 The Postal Service would 
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need to hire trained staff and design a uniform underwriting protocol, but as 
demonstrated by the fringe banking industry, which makes high margins of 
profit by offering relatively low-risk credit, the service does not require any 
specialized expertise. 
The U.S. Postal Service is struggling to maintain profitability and relevance 
as its services slowly become obsolete due to the Internet and other 
technological advances.392 By rethinking the purpose of the Postal Service and 
its many existing branches, the Postal Service might be saved and a serious 
public need could be met. Launching such a system would certainly require up-
front costs and marketing, but the costs of maintaining such a system would 
not have to be large. Customers would still pay a fee to cash a check, but the 
fee would not be as high as the fee they currently pay. Operating through the 
Postal Service would sacrifice some of the flexibility and innovation of the 
credit union and S&L movements, but the government subsidy and support 
would go a long way in providing access. Post offices already exist in all 
neighborhoods, and people of all classes and cultures have had interactions 
with the Postal Service. Thus, the barriers of access do not exist as they do 
with mainstream commercial banks. 
The poor pay more for credit than any other sector of the population, and 
private companies profit from that spread.393 The government could step into 
this sector and offer lower cost credit options to the poor by only taking into 
account the actual cost of credit and forgoing large profit margins. For 
example, many members of the military currently use fringe lenders to turn 
their government-backed paychecks into cash. There is virtually no risk 
associated with a government check, but members of the military pay 
astronomical fees for this service. If the Postal Service could offer to turn these 
checks into cash and only take account of the actual costs of the credit, 
members of the military could take home more of their hard-earned paychecks. 
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These services could be offered to the poor across the country without using 
banks as an intermediary. 
Government-sponsored student loans operate under this premise. A student 
borrower who qualifies for such a loan receives credit at a lower-than-market 
interest rate and remains indebted to the government until the loan is paid off. 
The government supports such loans because they facilitate an important 
public objective—educating the population. Enabling the poor to escape 
poverty is no less important a public concern. Offering good credit to the poor 
would enable economic mobility—which has lagged significantly in the United 
States in recent years—and solve a variety of public problems. 
Post office lending does not reach the level of services previously offered 
by S&Ls, credit unions, or Morris Banks, but it would certainly help alleviate 
some of the onerous costs of the fringe banking sector on the poor. And the 
competition provided by the government entering this sector could possibly 
drive prices down in the private fringe banking sector to reflect more 
accurately the risks of lending to the poor. Given the recent debacles of 
federally funded institutions, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal 
government would have to be cautious in taking on risks associated with 
lending to the poor. However, these services do not entail the scope of risks 
associated with home mortgages. Cashing a check for a small fee or offering a 
payday loan often involves very little risk. And although they do not provide 
the access to credit that was given by the previously mentioned full-service 
institutions, post office banking would provide more access for services that 
the poor need and are currently paying too much for. 
Enacting such a wide-scale change may not be politically feasible. 
Legislators have shown a lack of motivation to regulate the fringe banking 
industry in the past, mainly due to the lobbying strength of the sector.394 The 
fringe banking lobby would likely vigorously oppose government attempts to 
compete with the sector with the low-cost alternatives proposed here. 
However, after the Great Depression, President Roosevelt made significant and 
unpopular changes to the banking structure, like strengthening the S&L and the 
credit union, which made banking more accessible to the poor.395 These 
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changes were a response to an outcry by Americans who were suffering 
economically. President Roosevelt seized the economic upheaval of the 1930s 
to overcome similar political hurdles. A banking crisis often presents such an 
opportunity for enacting changes that benefit the public, and we again have the 
opportunity to reenvision the banking sector. The recent recession is the 
greatest banking crisis the United States has faced since the Great Depression 
and therefore presents an opportunity to change the banking structure. 
CONCLUSION 
“Poor people are not just like rich people without money. . . . Poverty 
creates an abrasive interface with society; poor people are always bumping into 
sharp legal things.”396 Thus, they cannot be banked just like rich people with 
less money. The poor often have different financial habits, culture, and 
preferences than the middle class, such as a desire for informality and a need 
for short-term credit. A banking structure aimed at meeting their needs would 
have to be responsive to these preferences if it is to successfully replace the 
pernicious fringe banks currently dominating financial services to the poor.  
Currently, many of the poor only access the financial system through fringe 
banks that operate at high costs to the poor. This type of credit keeps the poor 
indebted with crippling interest rates for long periods of time, introducing 
additional barriers to their escape from poverty. The poor use these institutions 
because there are currently no banks designed to meet their needs. This was 
not always the case. In the past, the government has supported banks with a 
special mission of meeting the needs of the poor, such as credit unions, S&Ls, 
and Morris Banks. 
These successful charters aimed to provide credit and access for the poor 
and shared a few common traits: they were born of necessity, they were 
created outside the dominant banking framework, they were innovative, and 
they had the support of the government. Yet all of these institutions have 
abandoned their initial missions due to structural and philosophical changes in 
the banking framework. This Article identifies trends in modern banking that 
have resulted in a homogenization of bank structures across the industry, 
which has left little room for banks seeking to serve disadvantaged 
communities. Such trends include deregulation and structural changes in the 
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banking sector that have caused all banks to compete with each other for 
higher profit margins. 
Since the demise of these institutions, there have been several attempts to 
force mainstream banks to meet the needs of the poor—all of which have 
failed. Mainstream banks have been unable to offer productive products 
because of their unwillingness and inability to reduce profits. In order to 
properly serve the disadvantaged in this country, some of the more lucrative 
ventures must be sacrificed. But the goal is worth pursuing. Providing credit to 
the underprivileged can help them escape poverty in a way that rewards self-
reliance. Although banking is not a right, it is a social good—not just for the 
low-income, but for the entire society. This Article attempts to encourage the 
development of banking institutions that would provide more people access to 
the government-subsidized banking system that already exists. 
The credit union, S&L, and Morris Bank show that a bank must operate 
outside the mainstream banking culture as well as have the support of the 
government to succeed. Thus, this Article proposes several alternative banking 
structures that would meet the needs of the poor, such as providing more 
support for the CDBA system, promoting formal lending circles, or using the 
Postal Service to offer check cashing and payday lending services. Above all, 
this Article highlights the void in banking the poor and attempts to revive the 
public purpose of banks. 
 
